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 Current research proposes that rumination, perseverating on thoughts about one’s 
feelings and problems, predicts the severity, likelihood, and duration of depression 
(Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001). One factor that might affect 
rumination outcomes is the level of abstraction one adopts when thinking about negative 
experiences. A growing body of research demonstrates that adopting a non-abstract, 
concrete perspective (e.g., focusing on specific details and sensations) reduces rumination 
(e.g., Watkins, Baeyens, & Read, 2009). Additionally, some empirical evidence suggests 
that abstract thinking (e.g., focusing on values, meaning, and general concepts) increases 
rumination when focusing on negative content (e.g., Watkins, 2004). In contrast, other 
experimental studies suggest that there are types of abstract processing that reduce 
rumination (Kross & Ayduk 2008; Rude, Mazzetti, Pal, & Stauble, 2011).  
 This study built on the research supporting positive effects of abstract processing. 
The primary aim of this study was to determine if there are types of abstract processing 
that, when used in conjunction with concrete processing, can reduce rumination and can 




examine negative experiences that were particularly bothersome and write about them 
from one of three perspectives: a) a mixed condition that encouraged participants to 
explore their abstract values and connect them to concrete thoughts and actions; b) a 
concrete condition that encouraged thinking only about concrete thoughts and actions; 
and c) a control condition that directed participants to write about their daily routines. A 
sample of 252 college students completed measures of rumination, OGM, and depression 
at pre-intervention, post-intervention, and a two week follow-up. Results indicated that 
the treatment effects significantly interacted with initial depression, such that participants 
who had high initial levels of depression had significantly lower rumination and 
depression in the mixed and concrete conditions compared to the control condition 
following the intervention. Findings suggest that treatment differences in depression were 
meditated by changes in rumination. The limitations and implications of the results are 
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Negative events are certain to arise in each of our lives. Sometimes we are able to 
experience a negative event without any major impact on our psychological well-being. 
At other times we may repetitively focus on the negative consequences of the event, and 
may enter a ruminative cycle. Although definitions vary, in general, rumination can be 
described as repetitive thinking that usually centers on themes of discrepancy between 
current and desired status (Smith & Alloy, 2009).  
Rumination has unique characteristics that distinguish it from other forms of 
repetitive thought. For example, both cognitive processing and problem solving can 
involve repetitively attending to a negative theme or problem. However, these forms of 
repetitive thought help individuals work through negative emotions and situations 
(Horowitz, 1985; Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Tait & Silver, 1989). In contrast, rumination is 
marked by a pattern of repetitive thought that leads to stagnation and increased negative 
affect (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Lyubomirsky, Tucker, Caldwell, & Berg, 
1999). Perhaps, the type of repetitive thought most similar to rumination is worry. 
Rumination and worry are significantly correlated and are characterized by cognitive 
inflexibility and difficulty in switching attention from negative stimuli (Fresco et al., 
2002; Muris, Roelofs, Meesters, & Boomsma, 2004; Segerstrom et al., 2000; Watkins, 
2004; Watkins, Moulds, & Mackintosh, 2005). However, factor analysis shows them to 
be distinct, and worry is more closely associated with anxiety, whereas rumination is 




Segerstrom et al., 2000; Watkins, 2008; Watkins et al., 2005). Furthermore, worry tends 
to be future oriented, involves a fear reaction, and may be motivated by an attempt to 
plan for or anticipate future threats (Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & DePree, 1983; 
Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, and Lyubomirsky, 2008). In contrast, rumination is 
characterized by a past or present focus, involves themes of discrepancy or loss, and is 
motivated by a desire to understand (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, and Lyubomirsky, 2008). 
Thus, rumination is a unique psychological phenomenon, and given over two decades of 
research that establish a connection between ruminative thought and several mental 
health concerns, an important one to investigate.  
Consequences of Rumination 
Rumination is related to poor problem solving, memory deficits, and depression. 
Experimental inductions of ruminative-like thinking increase negative mood and decrease 
problem solving (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Lyubomirsky et al., 1999; 
Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow, 1993). Moreover, rumination contributes to overgeneral 
autobiographical memory -- difficulties recalling specific memories about the events in 
one’s life (see Williams, 2007 for a review). However, by far the most researched aspect 
of rumination is its relationship to the development and maintenance of depression.  
Empirical evidence demonstrates rumination is concurrently associated with 
depression and predicts the onset and severity of depression (e.g., Butler & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1994; Harrington & Blankenship, 2002; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1995; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001). Additionally, the 




cause distress (Moberly & Watkins, 2008). Considering the relationship of rumination to 
depression, a disorder that the World Health Organization estimates will be the second 
most burdensome health concern in the world by the year 2020 (Murray & Lopez, 1997; 
World Health Organization, 2001), it is important to target the factors that cause and 
maintain rumination.  
Control Theory  
Control Theory (Carver & Scheier, 1981, 1990) offers a comprehensive 
theoretical structure for understanding the mechanisms involved in rumination. Control 
Theory purports that people self-regulate their behavior, including mental activities, 
through a feedback loop. Within this loop, present states are compared to salient goals 
(Carver & Scheier, 1990). According to Control Theory, all people have multiple goals, 
which fall along a hierarchy. At the top of the hierarchy are important but abstract goals, 
such as “human connection.” As one moves down the hierarchy, goals are increasingly 
concrete. The lower levels contain specific behavior scripts for acting in line with the 
more abstract goals. For instance, “walking over and saying hello to my friend” might be 
a concrete goal that is in line with the higher-level goal of “human connection.” When 
people’s present states do not match their goals, they change their behavior to reduce the 
discrepancy. At times when the discrepancy cannot be resolved, negative affect is 
increased (Martin & Tesser, 2006). Control Theory explains rumination as a mechanism 
that occurs when individuals are repeatedly thwarted in attaining important goals. For 
example, people who are not making progress toward having “human connection” may 




conceptualization is that rumination will continue until the goal is reached, a substitute 
means of attaining the goal is found, or the individual disengages from the goal (Martin 
& Tesser, 2006). The idea of a hierarchy of goals, with higher-level goals being more 
abstract and lower-level goals being more concrete, has led some researchers to examine 
whether thinking at certain levels of abstraction increases rumination.  
Negative Effects of Abstract Thought on Rumination 
 Among research that examines the mechanisms of rumination, the work of 
Watkins brought attention to abstract thought as an important component of rumination 
(Watkins, 2008). Borrowing from a number of theories, including Control Theory, 
Watkins has defined thought at the abstract level as “general,	  superordinate,	  and	  
decontextualized	  mental	  representations	  that	  convey	  the	  essential	  meaning	  of	  goals,	  
events,	  and	  actions.”	  He	  contrasts	  this	  with	  concrete	  thought,	  which	  he	  states,	  
“involves	  subordinate,	  contextual,	  and	  specific	  details	  of	  goals,	  events,	  and	  actions.”	  
(Watkins,	  2011,	  p.	  261).	  Watkins and colleagues theorize that adopting high-level, 
abstract thinking during processing of negative content is akin to ruminating (Moberly & 
Watkins, 2006; Watkins, 2004, 2008). They argue that, as specific details are not 
available, a focus on abstract concepts makes problem solving more difficult; thus, 
moving out of rumination is more challenging. In addition, they suggest that if negative 
content is examined at the abstract level, negative feelings may be generalized across 
situations. For example, a bad grade on a test could cause students to generalize that they 




 Several experimental studies indicate that individuals, who are encouraged to 
think at a more abstract level, have higher rumination and negative affect than individuals 
thinking concretely (Moberly & Watkins, 2006; Raes, Watkins, Williams, & Hermans, 
2008; Rimes & Watkins, 2005; Watkins, Moberly, & Moulds, 2008; Watkins & Moulds, 
2005; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001). For example, Moberly and Watkins (2006) trained 
participants to examine photographs and think either concretely by imagining “the	  
details	  of	  what	  is	  happening	  in	  each	  scenario”	  or	  abstractly	  by	  thinking	  “about	  the	  
causes,	  meanings,	  and	  implications	  of	  each	  situation.”	  The	  study	  found	  that	  for	  
participants	  in	  the	  abstract	  thinking	  condition,	  rumination	  was	  associated	  with	  less	  
positive	  affect. Watkins hypothesized that if high-level, abstract processing is related to 
rumination, low-level, concrete processing may break the ruminative cycle (Watkins, 
2008). A recent study demonstrated that dysphoric individuals trained to think concretely 
had a greater reduction in depression and rumination than the waiting list control 
(Watkins, Baeyens, & Read, 2009). Therefore, research into level of abstraction has 
already yielded some possible treatments for rumination and depression. 	  
Positive Effects of Abstract Thought on Rumination 
 Given that a connection between rumination and level of abstraction appears to 
exist, more research into this area could help to elucidate the nature of the relationship 
and create better treatments. One particular area that warrants further investigation is 





 In contrast to Watkins’ studies, several researchers experimentally induced types 
of abstract thought that reduced rumination. (Ayduk & Kross, 2008; Rude, Mazzetti, Pal, 
& Stauble, 2011). In multiple studies, Ayduk and Kross found that adopting an abstract 
but distanced perspective when viewing negative events (e.g., “take a few step back from 
the experience”) decreased rumination (see Ayduk & Kross, 2010 for a review). 
Additionally, Rude et al. (2011) demonstrated that encouraging individuals to view 
negative experiences from a broader context also reduced rumination. For example, they 
asked participants to adopt an “abstract-contextual” perspective about a rejection 
experience by answering questions, such as, “How do you think you will view this event 
in 1–2 years?” Instead of leading to increases in rumination, this type of abstract thought 
actually decreased rumination compared to the control condition. Whereas Watkins 
(2011) argued that abstract thinking is “decontextualized,” these authors suggest that 
abstract thought can provide greater context to negative experiences by giving the 
individual more perspective. Therefore, these studies provide experimental evidence for 
possible benefits of certain types of abstract thought in reducing rumination.  
 Rude et al. (2011) proposed that self-judgment might be a factor that determines 
the effect of abstract thinking on rumination. They suggested the detrimental aspects of 
Watkins’ previous abstract conditions may, to some extent, arise from abstraction being 
confounded with self-judgment. In several of Watkins’ studies, the abstract condition 
either explicitly or implicitly pulls for evaluation (Watkins, 2004; Watkins, Moberly, and 
Moulds, 2008). For instance, one study asked participants to think about their “empty 




(Watkins, Moberly, and Moulds, 2008). The thought “empty lives” seems to pull for 
more self-judgment in addition to more abstraction. Other studies have explicitly paired 
abstraction and evaluation. In one study, the condition was even named abstract-
evaluative (Moberly & Watkins, 2006). In contrast, abstract thought that is not 
confounded with self-judgment may allow the individual to gain context on negative 
events.  
 There are also theoretical reasons to believe that certain types of abstract thought 
may be useful in reducing rumination, particularly when combined with concrete thought. 
From the Control Theory framework, abstract thought is beneficial in that it encourages 
personal meaning and ensures that lower-level actions remain directed toward what is 
important to an individual (Carver & Scheier, 1998). Consistent with this notion, an 
explicit examination of thwarted important goals could help organize actions and 
facilitate finding alternative ways to resume progress. Therefore, whereas Watkins 
contends that abstract thought is always problematic when examining negative content, 
certain types of abstract thought, coupled with concrete thought, may decrease 
rumination. In addition, Carver and Scheier (1998) highlight the importance of flexibility 
in one’s focus on the levels of the hierarchy with the ability to move through different 
levels important for adapting to problematic events. As such, a perspective that 
encourages traversing the hierarchy may be most useful in reducing rumination.  
The Present Study: Exploring a Mixed Perspective 
 Based on the divergence within the literature, an aim of the present study was to 




interventions to reduce rumination. Specifically, the study included an intervention that 
asked individuals to examine their abstract values, explore them in terms of bothersome 
negative events, and find alternative concrete ways to act in line with their values. A 
sample of 252 college students, prescreened for a minimum level of rumination, was 
asked to write about negative experiences. Participants wrote four times over two weeks 
from either: (1) a concrete perspective that resembled Watkins and colleagues’ 
concreteness training (Watkins, Baeyens, & Read, 2009), (2) a mixed abstract-concrete 
perspective that included an exploration of abstract values, or (3) a control perspective 
that asked participants to think about a negative event but write about an unrelated topic. 
The participants in the conditions were compared at post-intervention and at a two-week 
follow-up for reductions in rumination. It was expected that by learning to examine 
negative experiences from a mixed perspective, individuals would be less likely to 
ruminate than individuals who were trained to think concretely or not trained to think 
from a particular perspective. 
Possible Beneficial Mechanisms of a Mixed Perspective 
Given the research discussed above, this study explored three possible 
mechanisms through which combining an exploration of abstract values with concrete 
thought might prove beneficial. One possible mechanism is that an explicit exploration of 
values could help people act and think more in line with their values and find alternative 
ways to reach them. By moving between the concrete and abstract levels of thinking, 
individuals’ actions may be more connected and better organized. This organization may 




toward important thwarted goals. Therefore, this study explored whether any significant 
decrease in rumination for the mixed condition would be due to an increase in the degree 
to which individuals acted in line with their higher-level values and goals. 
The second proposed way that combining abstract values with concrete thought 
might reduce rumination is through encouraging greater personal meaning. According to 
Control Theory, one of the advantages of abstract thought is that it provides meaning 
(Carver & Scheier, 1998). Because abstract goals by definition are more important and 
meaningful than concrete goals, explicitly connecting concrete actions to abstract values 
may increase the importance of actions, and thus, increase meaning. Greater personal 
meaning is associated with lower levels of rumination (Michael & Snyder, 2005) and 
lower levels of depression (Mascaro & Rosen, 2008; Westerhof, Bohlmeijer, van 
Beljouw, & Pot, 2010). Therefore, it is reasonable to hypothesize that exploring values 
may lead to increases in meaning, which in turn may reduce rumination. Accordingly, 
this study explored whether an increase in personal meaning was responsible for 
improvements in rumination for the mixed condition compared to the other conditions.  
A final possible mechanism that might be responsible for how successful the 
mixed perspective is could be the degree of self-judgment produced. As discussed above, 
Rude et al. (2011) suggested that self-judgment might be an important factor in 
determining the effect on rumination. Therefore, self-judgment was examined as a 




Rumination and Overgeneral Autobiographical Memory 
  In addition to understanding which mechanisms might be responsible decreasing 
rumination in the mixed condition, it was also important to determine if decreasing 
rumination led to a reduction in related psychological processes. Thus, an aim of the 
study was to determine if cognitive styles related to rumination would benefit from any of 
the conditions. To this end, overgeneral autobiographical memory (OGM)—a tendency to 
remember self-referential memories in a non-specific way— was included as an outcome 
in the study (Williams et al., 2007). As rumination is thought to contribute to OGM, this 
study examined whether rumination mediated the relationship between the condition to 
which a participant was assigned and OGM.  
Rumination and Depression 
 The final, and ultimate, aim of this study was to examine if any reduction in 
rumination by the conditions would lead to a reduction in depression. Measures of 
depression were administered to determine if the mixed condition led to a reduction in 
depressive symptoms and if changes in rumination mediated that reduction. It is hoped 
that the results of this study will help determine possible conditions under which a mixed 
perspective can diminish rumination, with the eventual goal of decreasing the symptoms 






Review of the Literature 
This review establishes the importance of studying rumination by examining 
evidence that rumination contributes to various forms of psychopathology but particularly 
to depression. Next, theories about the causes and contributing factors of rumination are 
examined. This is followed by a discussion of recent research, which suggests that 
abstract thought might maintain rumination. Subsequently, an analysis of possible types 
of abstract thought that may reduce rumination is presented. The final section provides an 
examination of limitations in the current research and argues for the benefits of exploring 
the positive aspects of abstract thought in conjunction with concrete thought.  
Rumination 
Defining Rumination. 
Although no unified definition of rumination exists, the most commonly used 
definitions have a great deal in common; generally, rumination can be defined as a form 
of repetitive thought that tends to center on themes of discrepancy between current and 
desired status and that stagnates processing (Smith & Alloy, 2009). Of the multiple 
theories of rumination, Nolen-Hoeksema’s work on ruminative response styles is the 
most widely used. In this line of research, rumination was traditionally defined as 
“thoughts that focus one’s attention on one’s depressive symptoms and on the 
implications of these symptoms” (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, p. 569). For example, the 
ruminative styles questionnaire developed by Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1991) asks 




you feel.” Recently, Nolen-Hoeksema has broadened her view, defining rumination “as 
the process of thinking perseveratively about one’s feelings and problems” (Nolen-
Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008, p. 400). Others have taken an even more 
inclusive definition. For example, Martin and Tesser (1996) defined rumination as “a 
class of conscious thoughts that revolve around a common instrumental theme and that 
recur in the absence of immediate environmental demands requiring the thoughts’’ 
(Martin and Tesser, 1996, p. 7). A further exploration of various definitions will be 
presented with the specific theories of rumination. However, before discussing the 
intricacies of particular theories, it will be useful to examine why it is important to study 
rumination, namely, the connection between rumination and depression.  
Consequences of Rumination  
Rumination is associated with several forms of psychopathology. For instance, 
rumination predicts heightened binge drinking and symptoms of alcohol abuse (Nolen-
Hoeksema, Larson, & Grayson, 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema & Harrell, 2002). Other studies 
find that rumination has both an association with anxiety and an ability to predict anxiety 
(e.g., Ciarrochi et al., 2003; Fresco et al., 2002; Harrington & Blakenship, 2002). 
However, the vast majority of rumination research focuses on mood and depression 
symptoms.  
Evidence demonstrates that rumination is concurrently associated with 
depression, that rumination predicts the onset and severity of depression, and when 
experimentally induced, rumination exacerbates sad mood (e.g., Butler & Nolen-




1995; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001). Because 
rumination has been central in mood and depression research, the relationship warrants a 
closer examination. Most research into depression and rumination fits into one of three 
designs: cross-sectional, longitudinal, or experimental.  
Numerous cross-sectional studies examined the relationship between rumination 
and depression. Cross-sectional research can be further divided into three main designs: 
(1) correlations between rumination and depressive symptoms (e.g., Abela, Vanderbilt, & 
Rochon, 2004; Harrington & Blankenship, 2002), (2) cross-sectional studies comparing 
the level of rumination in non-depressed controls and depressed individuals, or the level 
of depression in ruminators and non-ruminators (e.g., Riso et al., 2003), and (3) studies 
that conduct both correlation and group difference designs (e.g., Lam, Smith, Checkley, 
Rijsdijk, & Sham, 2003). In a review of over 100 studies, Thomsen (2006) argued that 
cross-sectional research points to a positive association between depressive symptoms 
and rumination when sampling from non-depressed groups. Thomsen’s review suggested 
that a positive, yet weaker, association exists for clinical samples. Additionally, cross-
sectional studies found that an association between rumination and depressive symptoms 
exists in multiple developmental stages, including childhood (Abela, Vanderbilt, & 
Rochon, 2004) and adolescence (Kuyken, Watkins, Holden, & Cook, 2006). Another 
important finding from the cross-sectional literature is that rumination may partially 
explain the greater occurrence of depression in women; several studies found that 
rumination accounts for part of the association between gender and depression (Grant et 




Longitudinal studies suggest that rumination predicts symptoms of dysphoria and 
depression. After accounting for baseline symptoms, multiple studies found that a 
tendency toward depressive rumination in non-depressed groups predicted depressive 
symptoms at later times (Abela, Brozina, & Haigh, 2002; Butler & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1994; Hong, 2007; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema, Stice, Wade, & Bohon, 
2007; Verstraeten, Vasey, Raes, & Bijttebier, 2009). Utilizing a broader definition of 
rumination, repetitive thinking about negative subject matter, also predicted future 
depression (Ito, Takenaka, & Agari, 2005; Ito, Takenaka, Tomita, & Agari, 2006; Rector 
& Roger, 1996). The ability of rumination to predict depressive symptoms was also 
demonstrated in clinical samples (Kuehner & Weber, 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; 
Raes et al., 2006; Rohan, Sigmon, & Dorhofer, 2003).  
 Experimental studies indicate several negative consequences to inducing 
rumination-like thinking. Commonly, experimenters will compare a manipulated 
rumination group (e.g., “think about and concentrate on the meaning of the sentence… I 
often wonder why I feel the way I do?”) and a distraction group that is directed to think 
about non-emotional content (e.g., ‘‘think about and concentrate on the meaning of the 
sentence… It would be interesting to visit other countries,” Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1990). Studies applying these procedures in clinical populations demonstrate that 
rumination groups increase negative mood compared to distraction groups (Lavender & 
Watkins, 2004; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1990; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001). Moreover, 




problem-solving skills (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Lyubomirsky et al., 
1999) and may have reduced motivation. For instance, experimentally induced depressive 
rumination can reduce engagement in pleasant activities in dysphoric patients. 
(Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993).  
Rumination and Negative Events 
 Rumination may worsen the detrimental consequences brought on by a single 
negative event. For example, a ruminative style predicts future depressive symptoms for 
events such as a natural disaster or the death of a loved one (Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker, & Larson, 1994). In addition, the interaction of 
rumination and negative cognitive styles following a negative life event has been shown 
to predict the lifetime rate of Major Depressive Disorder (Alloy et al., 2000).  
Moberly and Watkins (2008) recently conducted a study to attempt to understand 
the relationship between rumination, negative life events, and negative affect. In an effort 
to get unbiased information, the authors utilized experience-sampling methodology, in 
which participants reported their thoughts and experiences when an alarm on a wrist-
worn device sounded. The findings indicated that the more individuals ruminate about 
everyday stressful events, the more likely they are to experience distress (Moberly & 
Watkins, 2008).  
Whereas a tendency to ruminate seems to have a role in depressive reactions to 
events, negative events also may increase rumination. Increases in rumination have been 
linked to interpersonal interactions (Abbot & Rapee, 2004; Rachman, Grüter-Andrew, & 




McIntosh and Martin (1992) theorized that when single negative events are taken to be an 
indication of a more global failure, the events can increase rumination and negative 
affect. Furthermore, the more important the event is to the individual, the more likely it is 
to induce rumination (Moberly & Watkins, 2010).  Therefore, a ruminative style 
increases the likelihood that a negative event will lead to depressed mood, but important 
negative events will also lead to an increase in rumination. 
Rumination and Other Factors that Maintain Depression 
 Rumination increases several other factors that maintain and make one vulnerable 
to depression. When depressed or dysphoric individuals ruminate, they are more likely to 
think negatively about events and the future (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995). 
Rumination also leads to poorer problem solving abilities and lower self-efficacy for 
solving problems (Donaldson & Lam, 2004; Gilliam, 2006; Lyubomirsky et al., 1999). 
Furthermore, ruminators may be less likely to try pleasant activities that might help 
reduce depression (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993).  
 A major focus of current research is the role of rumination in the phenomenon of 
overgeneral autobiographical memory (OGM). Autobiographical memory is “the aspect 
of memory that is concerned with the recollection of personally experienced past events” 
(Williams et al., 2007, p. 122). When asked to recall memories of specific past events, 
some individuals have a tendency to give general responses (Williams & Broadbent, 
1986). Such individuals are said to have an overgeneral autobiographical memory style. 
OGM predicts the severity and likelihood of future depression (Hermans et al., 2008; 




associated with delayed recovery from depression (Brittlebank, Scott, Williams, & 
Ferrier, 1993; Peeters et al., 2002). Researchers theorize that this memory deficit may 
lead to difficulties with problem solving and planning for the future, which further 
increases depression vulnerability (for a review see Williams, 2007). Importantly, 
rumination is believed to be one of the main mechanisms in OGM; when individuals get 
“captured” in a ruminative cycle, they cannot gain access to specific memories, and thus 
demonstrate an overgeneral autobiographical memory (Williams, 2007). Consequently, 
rumination may not only directly increase depression, but may also increase several other 
risk factors for depression. 
Theories of Rumination 
 Reviews of research in the field point to at least ten theories of rumination (Smith 
and Alloy, 2009; Watkins, 2008). Some of these focus specifically on rumination 
regarding depressive symptoms, sadness, or reactions to stressful events (Stress-Reactive 
Model of Rumination, Alloy et al., 2000; Rumination on Sadness, Conway, Csank, Holm, 
& Blake, 2000; Ruminative Response Styles Theory, Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). Other 
theories are based on broader definitions of rumination, focusing on achievement of life 
goals or self-regulation (Goal Progress Theory, Martin & Tesser, 2006; Self-Regulatory 
Executive Functioning, Wells & Matthews, 1996). As Smith and Alloy (2009) argue, the 
various theories are largely overlapping and can be used to augment each other.  
The current review will focus on the two theoretical models most pertinent to 
present purposes: Goal Progress Theory and Watkins’ Level of Construal Theory. In 




Response Styles Theory (RST, Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991), a basic summary of RST will be 
given. 
Response Styles Theory  
 The most widely researched theory of rumination is Nolen-Hoeksema’s Response 
Styles Theory (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). RST defines rumination as repetitive thinking 
that focuses on the symptoms, causes, and consequences of negative mood. This theory 
holds that a ruminative coping style is learned in childhood. Nolen-Hoeksema and 
colleagues suggest that this learning occurs through modeling by parents (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, Mumme, Wolfson, & Guskin, 1995) or because 
parents act overcritical and controlling (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1995). In this 
conceptualization, rumination becomes a consistent style of responding to depressed 
mood or to trauma (Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1993). RST 
suggests that a cyclic effect exists between rumination and depression. According to this 
hypothesis, negative mood maintains or increases negative thinking, and in turn, negative 
thinking maintains or increases negative mood. Thus, a vicious cycle exists that sustains 
depressive symptoms (Nolen-Hoeksema, Stice, Wade, & Bohon, 2007). While there has 
been a great deal of empirical support for many aspects of RST (Morrow & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1990; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1993), 
several researchers have suggested that RST may be too restrictive in its definition to 
encompass all aspects of rumination.  
 The major criticism of RST theory is that it limits the possible subject of 




2008). Martin and Tesser (1996) argue that if rumination is a style of thinking, it should 
not be restricted to specific content areas. For example, individuals may ruminate on the 
end of a relationship, but not necessarily the fact that they are depressed. Other 
researchers have also suggested that the content of rumination may not result from 
depressed mood but rather from negative events (Alloy et al., 2000; Brinker & Dozois, 
2009).  
A second criticism is that RST is not broad enough to provide a full explanation 
of research involving levels of abstraction (Watkins, 2008). For instance, research has 
shown that the consequences of rumination may differ based on whether the content of 
the rumination is abstract or concrete (Moberly & Watkins, 2006; Rimes & Watkins, 
2005; Watkins, 2004; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002; Watkins & Moulds, 2005; Watkins & 
Teasdale, 2001, 2004). These findings are the basis for the present study and will be 
discussed in more detail in the upcoming sections. For now it is sufficient to say that 
Nolen-Hoeksema has acknowledged these findings but has not yet discussed how they 
could be incorporated into RST theory (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 
2008).  
Goal Progress Theory  
 Martin & Tesser (1989, 1996, 2006) proposed Goal Progress Theory to explain 
rumination within the Control Theory paradigm. Control Theory purports that people 
self-regulate behavior, including mental activities, through a feedback loop. Within this 
loop, present actions and states are compared to salient goals or values. Control Theory 




their current state and desired values, goals, or outcomes (Carver & Scheier, 1981, 1990). 
At any one time, individuals will be engaged in achieving multiple goals (Martin & 
Tesser, 2006).  
Control Theory suggests that goals fall along a hierarchy with the top levels in the 
hierarchy guiding the lower levels. At the top of the hierarchy are very abstract concepts, 
such as the person’s ideal-self, or a vague conceptualization of who the person aspires to 
be. The next level of reference values is principles. Carver and Scheier (1990) state, 
“principles are probably the most abstract aspects of behavior that have names in 
everyday language—for example, honesty and responsibility. Principles are not 
specifications of acts but of qualities that can be manifest in many acts (p. 20).” The 
levels below principles contain specific behavior scripts for acting in line with the more 
abstract principles. In addition, higher-level goals (e.g., being honest) are more abstract 
and occur across situations (Carver & Scheier, 1990). Lower-level goals (e.g., telling the 
truth in a given situation) represent specific actions or behaviors. Higher-level goals are 
beneficial in that they direct behavior in a consistent way, increase motivation, and 
reduce impulsivity (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987, 1989). Lower-
level goals are important in that they provide details of how to carry out the higher-level 
goals to which they connect. Carver and Scheier (1990) propose that there are meta-
control processes in place that monitor overall progress at all levels of the hierarchy.  
It is helpful to look at an example of how the goal hierarchy might function in 
actual practice. Figure 1 illustrates a possible hierarchy, which may be active when a 





Figure 1. An example of a goal hierarchy. The behavior, which is described more fully in 
the text, is that of a young man making a turn while driving to a friend's house to return 




In this goal hierarchy, the highest-level goal that is salient is “being a responsible 
person.”  Recall that the higher the level of the goal the more important and more 
enduring the goal is. Therefore, “being a responsible person” is a consistent goal that will 
remain throughout many different situations in this man’s life. In addition, as one moves 
down the hierarchy, goals become more concrete and provide the means to accomplish 
the goal above them. For example, the man wants to “be a responsible person,” which is 
accomplished by “following through on commitments,” which is in turn accomplished by 
“driving over to his friend’s house,” and so on. Whereas lower-level goals provide the 
means to complete higher-level goals, higher-level goals provide the reasons for lower-
level goals. For example, the man’s reason for putting his “fingers around the wheel” is 
to “turn the wheel.” The lower-level goals are very concrete and short lived. It may take 
several lower-level actions to complete a higher-level task. For example, to drive over to 
the friend’s house, the individual may need to make several turns. At each moment, a 
comparison is made to check for a decrease in the discrepancy between the person’s 
present state and the various goals in the hierarchy. However, problems may arise when 
progress toward higher-level goals is not made. 
Goal Progress Theory and Rumination  
Within the Goal Progress Theory literature, rumination is defined as “a class of 
conscious thoughts that revolve around a common instrumental theme and that recur in 
the absence of immediate environmental demands requiring the thoughts’’ (Martin & 
Tesser, 1996, p. 7). Rumination arises when people are repeatedly thwarted or fail to 




individuals must disengage from the goal, find a substitute means of achieving it, or 
resume progress toward it (Martin & Tesser, 2006).  
 Evidence suggests that when a goal is thwarted, information pertaining to that 
goal becomes highly accessible. Early support for this phenomenon comes from the work 
of Zeigarnik (1938) who hypothesized that needs cause tensions. Ziegarnik had subjects 
complete some tasks and leave others incomplete. She found that information pertaining 
to a task left incomplete was more likely to remain active in memory (Zeigarnik, 1938).  
More recently, Rothermund (2003) designed an experiment to test whether the 
tendency for unfinished tasks to remain active was automatic. First, participants chose 
words in a synonym-matching task, and received both positive and negative feedback on 
trials regardless of performance. In the second part of the experiment, participants had to 
name a word surrounded by two distracter words. The distracter words were selected 
from the earlier synonym task. When the distracters were from trials where the 
participant had previously received negative feedback, the reaction time of the participant 
was increased. Thus, Rothermund concluded that participants were more vigilant to 
failures, because the failure words captured attention even when the task required 
attention elsewhere. Martin and Tesser (2006) argue that this is directly related to the 
rumination that occurs following failure in goal progress. In fact, Goal Progress Theory 
proposes that the more important the goal, the more likely rumination is to occur (Martin 
& Tesser, 2006). For example, Lavallee and Campbell (1995) had participants keep a 




were goal relevant and personally important, they were associated with higher levels of 
rumination. Watkins has recently found similar results (Moberly & Watkins, 2010). 
 Escaping Rumination  
According to Goal Progress Theory, disengaging from a frustrated goal is an 
effective, but difficult to achieve, means to lower rumination (Martin & Tesser 2006; 
Wrosch, Miller, Scheier, & de Pontet, 2007). Certain goals may be personally important 
but unlikely or impossible to fulfill (e.g., the desire to be a star quarterback after tearing 
an ACL). In situations like this, disengaging from the goal is essential. Research 
deonstrates that individuals who were able to disengage from goals that they were not 
actively progressing toward and who adopted new goals had lower rumination (Wrosch, 
Scheier, Carver, & Schulz, 2003; Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, Schulz, & Carver, 2003). This 
process may be more effective in individuals with greater well-being (Wrosch, Scheier, 
Miller, Schulz, & Carver, 2003). Martin and Tesser (2006) argue that the multiple goals 
pursued by an individual at one time are in balance. Although the current configuration of 
goals may not be the ideal state, disengaging from a goal requires initially unbalancing 
the current mix of goals; therefore, the individual may temporarily feel purposeless. 
Thus, disengaging from a goal is difficult. Martin and Tesser (2006) suggest that 
disengagement from old goals and engagement in other goals may result more easily 
during trauma and/or brushes with death. In summation, research seems to demonstrate 
that disengaging from thwarted goals leads to a reduction in rumination. However, the 
procedure by which individuals accomplish disengagement is still unknown and is most 




 Perhaps, an easier way to end a ruminative cycle would be to find alternate low-
level goals that accomplish a higher-level goal. For example, imagine an individual who 
had a goal of helping other people by joining the Peace Corps. If the application to the 
Peace Corps is denied, the individual might be able to find an alternate means of fulfilling 
the higher-level goal of helping other people. For instance, the individual could spend a 
year working in soup kitchens, and rumination could be prevented. One study asked 
college freshmen to identify the person they were closest to before coming to college and 
list activities that they engaged in together. The freshmen then listed the activities for 
which they found substitutes at college. Findings indicated that freshmen who were able 
to find substitute activities ruminated less about the person they had left behind (K. 
Millar, Tesser, & M. Millar, 1988). In a separate study, Koole et al. (1999) were 
interested in the various ways participants fulfilled the higher-level goal of self-worth. 
The study provided participants with failure feedback on a bogus intelligence test. 
Following the feedback, participants reported increased levels of rumination. The 
researchers hypothesized that this rumination was connected to the thwarting of the 
higher-level goal of self-worth. To test this hypothesis, they allowed some participants to 
affirm values important to their self-worth. Results indicated that participants who were 
allowed to affirm their self-worth had content pertaining to intelligence tests less 
accessible. In other words, when a substitute means of fulfilling the higher goal of self-
worth was found, rumination about the failure experience was reduced.  
This begs the question, what hinders the discovery of alternative lower-level goals 




certain lower-level goal as the only way of achieving a higher goal. Building on this basic 
premise, McIntosh and Martin (1992) proposed the goal linkage model, which holds that 
people who link specific lower-level goals to the higher-level goal of happiness will have 
an increased rate of rumination. In their research, McIntosh and Martin compared linkers, 
individuals who believe happiness is contingent on fulfillment of certain goals, to non-
linkers, individuals who do not see goal completion as necessary for happiness 
(McIntosh, Martin, & Jones, 2001). Findings indicated that linkers generally have higher 
rates of unhappiness (McIntosh and Martin, 1992) and depression (McIntosh, Harlow, & 
Martin, 1995). Additionally, these higher rates of negative affect are largely accounted 
for by the increase in rumination of individuals who linked lower and higher goals 
(Martin & Tesser, 1996; McIntosh, Harlow, & Martin, 1995; McIntosh and Martin, 1992; 
McIntosh, Martin, & Jones, 2001). Brothers and Madux (2003) applied the linkage model 
in an attempt to understand why certain infertile women experience more distress than 
others. Using survey methods, Brothers and Maddux asked participants who had 
attempted unsuccessfully to have a child for the last year to complete measures on linking 
(e.g., “Having a biological child is essential to my happiness”), emotional distress, and 
rumination. Results indicated that linking predicted rumination. Furthermore, rumination 
predicted emotional distress. Rumination mediated the connection between linking and 
emotional distress. Moreover, McIntosh and Martin’s research on linking is in line with 
Goal Progress Theory’s conception of rumination.  
 In summary, Goal Progress Theory explains several important aspects of 




toward reducing the discrepancy between their current state and their goals. Research has 
demonstrated that thwarting goals increases the accessibility of information pertaining to 
that goal. In addition, the more important the goal, the more likely rumination is to occur. 
One effective but difficult way to halt rumination is to disengage from a goal. Finding an 
alternative way to satisfy the goal can also reduce rumination. However, this may be 
problematic if the individual only sees specific ways of fulfilling a goal.  
Watkins’ Level of Construal Theory 
Level of Construal Theory proposes that key in the development and formation of 
rumination is the degree of abstraction present when perceiving negative events. Watkins 
makes a distinction between two ways of perceiving events during processing: high-level, 
abstract construals and low-level, concrete construals. Though his definitions have gone 
through several iterations, recently, Watkins described abstract construals as “general, 
superordinate, and decontextualized mental representations that convey the essential gist 
and meaning of events and actions, such as inferences of global traits that are invariant 
across different situations” or “representations of ‘why’ an action is performed and of its 
ends and consequences.” Concrete construals are “lower-level mental representations that 
include subordinate, contextual, and incidental details of events and actions, such as 
inferences of situation-specific states” or “representations of the specific ‘how’ details of 
an action and of the means to an end” (Watkins, Baeyens, & Read, 2009, p. 56). Watkins 
proposed that thinking of abstract construals is related to rumination (Watkins, 2008). 




in a concrete way will reduce rumination and alleviate depressed mood (Watkins, 2008). 
On these premises, Watkins and colleagues developed an extensive research program.  
Evidence for Level of Construal Theory 
Initially, Watkins’ work grew out of the research of Teasdale (1999) who found 
that mindful, experiential self-focus on emotional material facilitates processing. As a 
next step in researching these phenomena, Watkins conducted several studies that 
compared an experiential mode of processing (depending on the study, this mode was 
also called low analysis or concrete) with an abstract mode of processing (also called 
analytic, high analysis, conceptual-evaluative, or abstract-evaluative) and examined the 
effect on rumination and depression (Moberly & Watkins, 2006; Raes, Watkins, 
Williams, & Hermans, 2008; Rimes & Watkins, 2005; Watkins, 2004; Watkins, Moberly, 
& Moulds, 2008; Watkins & Moulds, 2005; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004).  
The first such study researched the effects of encouraging ruminative-like 
thinking from two levels of abstraction and two levels of self-focus (Watkins & Teasdale, 
2001). Overgeneral autobiographical memory and depression were examined as 
outcomes. The study explored four conditions by asking participants to read several 
statements from a particular perspective: think about the meaning of several rumination 
statements (e.g., "Think about what your feelings might mean"; high analysis/ high self-
focus), focus their attention on the experience of several rumination statements (e.g., 
"Focus your attention on the experience of the physical sensations in your body"; low 
analysis/ high self-focus), focus their attention on distraction statements (e.g., "Think 




about abstract and philosophical items (e.g., "Think about trying to understand the world 
you live in"; high analysis/low self-focus). Results indicated that the high-analysis/high 
self-focus condition increased overgeneral autobiographical memory, a phenomenon 
related to rumination, but not depressive symptoms. The authors concluded that analytic 
self-focus may be a key component to rumination.  
A follow up study added some corroborative evidence. Watkins (2004) induced a 
failure experience and, subsequently, asked participants either a conceptual-evaluative 
question (i.e., ‘‘Why did you feel this way?”) or an experiential question (i.e., “How did 
you feel moment-by-moment?’’). Results indicated that participants in the conceptual-
evaluative condition had more intrusive thoughts about the failure than the experiential 
group (Watkins, 2004). Watkins and colleagues connected these findings to a parallel 
string of research and suggested that conceptual-evaluative self-focus might map onto 
higher levels of construal and be an active process in rumination.   
Subsequent studies built on the premise that a high level of construal is a key 
feature of rumination and examined how this perspective affects several correlates of 
rumination. Rimes and Watkins (2005) found that inducing participants to think from a 
highly analytic perspective increased ratings of self-worthlessness. In this study, Watkins 
compared an analytic self-focus condition with an experiential self-focus condition. 
Participants were asked to examine statements, which were based on Nolen-Hoeksema 
and Marrow’s (1993) rumination tasks. Instructions for the analytic self-focus condition 
asked participants to think about the causes, meanings, and consequences of each 




emphasized focusing one's attention on the experience of each symptom/sensation. 
Findings indicated that for depressed individuals, the analytic condition increased self-
judgments of worthlessness and increased levels of depression. This was not found for 
participants who were not currently depressed.  
Another study examined the effect of level of construal and trait rumination on 
affect. Moberly and Watkins (2006) asked student volunteers to write about positive or 
negative scenarios from either a concrete condition (e.g., “Imagine the details of what is 
happening in each scenario”) or an abstract- evaluative condition (e.g., “Think about the 
causes, meanings, and implications of each situation”). When this expressive writing task 
was followed by a failure task, construal level moderated the relationship between 
rumination and negative affect. The results demonstrated that high-trait ruminators had a 
reduced positive affect, but only in the abstract-evaluative group (Moberly & Watkins, 
2006).  
In a similar study, Watkins and colleagues tested the impact of abstract-evaluative 
thinking on emotional reactivity to negative events (Watkins, Moberly, & Moulds, 2008). 
Importantly, in this study the abstract-evaluative thinking condition was called the 
depressive rumination condition. This indicates that at this point Watkins and colleagues 
were beginning to equate the two. The study used a mixed student and community 
sample and included three experiments that induced abstract-evaluative thinking. The 
first two experiments used the same induction from the aforementioned study (Moberly 
& Watkins, 2006) in which scenarios were given to participants, and they were asked to 




previous study’s abstract-evaluative condition) or “a mode antithetical to depressive 
rumination” (the same as the previous study’s concrete condition). The third experiment 
induced the “depressive rumination” by using an interpretive bias training in which 
participants read 64 descriptions. Each description had a letter missing in the last word. 
Participants were asked to fill in the missing letter revealing a word that either 
encouraged abstract thinking (e.g., “Cleaning up the mess, you feel irritated because you 
are so careless”) or concrete thinking (e.g., “Cleaning up the mess, you feel irritated 
because you are so wet”). Following the induction of processing mode, participants in 
each experiment were asked take part in a failure task that had previously been shown to 
induce negative mood. Results in all three experiments indicated that participants in the 
“antithetical to depressive rumination” condition (i.e., concrete condition) had less 
emotional reactivity to a failure task, as measured by less negative affect, compared to the 
depressive rumination condition (i.e., abstract-evaluative mode; Watkins, Moberly, & 
Moulds, 2008). Based on these findings, Watkins and colleagues concluded that abstract 
construals were an important part of maintaining rumination.  
The Benefits of Focusing on the Specifics: Concreteness Training 
Watkins theorized that if high-level, abstract processing is related to rumination, 
low-level, concrete processing may break the ruminative cycle (Watkins, 2008). Based on 
this theory, Watkins implemented a concreteness-training program with a dysphoric, 
clinical population (Watkins, Baeyens, & Read, 2009). Participants were divided into a 
concreteness group, a bogus concreteness group, or a waiting list control. In both the 




initial two hour session. For the week following the initial session, participants spent 30 
minutes a day practicing a specific activity. During the initial training, the concreteness-
training group was guided in a relaxation exercise and then asked to think about six 
different scenarios. Three of the scenarios were fabricated negative situations whereas the 
other three were specific situations generated from the participants’ memories. Through 
guided imagery and direct questioning, the researchers encouraged thinking about the 
situations by: “(a) focusing on sensory details in the moment (e.g., questions asking 
participants to focus on and describe what they could see, hear, feel); (b) noticing what is 
specific and distinctive about the context of the event; (c) noticing the process of how 
events and behaviors unfold (e.g., ‘imagine a movie of how events unfolded’); (d) 
generating detailed step-by-step plans of how to proceed from here” (Watkins, Baeyens, 
& Read, 2009, p. 57). Following the initial session participants were given a recording of 
the training and asked to listen and journal for 30 minutes each day for the next week. 
Individuals in the bogus concreteness training condition received a similar amount of 
face-to-face interaction but completed the previously mentioned induction task, where 
they were asked to fill in a missing letter in the last word of the scenario (Watkins, 
Moberly, & Moulds, 2008). Words were selected to complete the scenario from a 
concrete perspective. Participants were also asked to imagine the scenario as vividly as 
possible. Results were mixed. In examining depressive symptoms, the concreteness group 
fared better than the bogus concreteness training in terms of a structured diagnostic 
interview. This was not the case for other outcome measures of depression and 




Nolen-Hoeksema’s Ruminative Styles Questionnaire (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 
1991). Still, the concreteness training group demonstrated greater improvement than the 
waiting list control group on both measures of depression and rumination (Watkins et al., 
2009).  
In a second study, Watkins and Moberly (2009) compared a similar concreteness 
training condition to a relaxation condition. In both conditions, participants listened to an 
audio recording for seven days, which reinforced the training. The concreteness training 
condition resulted in a significantly greater reduction in depression symptoms and 
marginally significant improvement in rumination symptoms (p = .06) compared to the 
relaxation training. Thus, the use of concreteness training has exhibited some promise as 
a possible treatment for rumination. 
Recently, Watkins (2008) attempted to integrate the previous literature on 
rumination. He identified three factors that might determine whether repetitive thought 
leads to helpful or harmful consequences: (1) valance of the thought content (i.e., 
negative or positive), (2) intrapersonal context (e.g., self-esteem), and (3) the level of 
construal. Watkins examined several theories that could explain these factors. He argued 
that Ruminative Styles Theory (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991) and Cognitive Theories (e.g., 
Greenberg, 1995; Horowitz, 1985; Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Teasdale & Barnard, 1993) did 
a fairly good job of accounting for valance and context but could not completely address 
his recent work on level of construal. Watkins (2008) contends that Control Theory 
(Carver & Scheier, 1981, 1990), particularly the work of Martin and Tesser (1989), 




Watkins proposed that a level of construal maps directly onto a position in the goal 
hierarchy; high-level, abstract construals correspond to high-level goals/values and low-
level, concrete construals correspond to low-levels of the goal hierarchy (Watkins, 2008). 
He has proposed that when individuals are depressed and experience negative events, 
they become stuck at the abstract level, which influences repetitive thought and worsens 
depressive symptomatology (Watkins, 2011).  
Empirical Evidence for Benefits of Abstract Thought 
 Whereas Watkins’ Level of Construal Theory holds that adopting abstract 
thinking in reference to negative content maintains a ruminative cycle, several 
researchers have found that abstract processing is not always detrimental (Kross & 
Ayduk, 2008; Rude et al., 2009). In fact, some experimental studies have demonstrated 
that abstract thought about negative consequences does not always increase rumination, 
and may, reduce it.  
Early evidence that abstract processing might not always be akin to rumination 
comes from the work of Hunt. Hunt (1998) was interested in emotional processing and 
how to cope with dysphoria following a negative life event. She conducted a study which 
asked participants to write from one of three perspectives following negative feedback on 
an IQ test: emotional processing (e.g., “focus on how you feel,” p. 365), disputation (e.g., 
“question whether these test results have any relevance,” p. 365), or distraction (e.g., 
“write… about your favorite television show,” p. 366). Of note, although the emotional 
processing condition had a strong concrete experiential component, it also asked 




performance. This latter piece resembles Watkins’ analytic induction (e.g., Moberly and 
Watkins, 2006). Thus, the emotional processing condition seems to be a mixture of both 
abstract and concrete thinking. Yet the following day, those in the emotional processing 
condition reported improved mood. The implication of this study is that focusing on 
negative content from a mixed perspective does not necessarily lead to rumination and 
depression.  
 More recently, Kross, Ayduk, and Mischel (2005) investigated the level of 
construal (abstract “why” vs. concrete “what”) and the type of self-perspective adopted 
(self-immersed vs. self-distanced). They conducted a study that asked participants to 
recall a bothersome interpersonal event and, subsequently, adopt a perspective based on 
two dimensions: level of immersion and level of construal. Immersion consisted of a self-
immersed condition (e.g., ‘‘go back to the time and place of the experience and relive the 
situation as if it were happening to you all over again,’’ p. 711) and a self-distanced 
condition (e.g., ‘‘take a few steps back and move away from your experience… watch the 
conflict unfold as if it were happening all over again to the distant you,’’ p. 711). For the 
second factor, level of construal, participants either thought about the feelings and 
sensations in the concrete “what” condition or the reasons underlying their feelings in the 
abstract “why” condition. The findings indicated that a distanced, abstract “why” 
perspective was more beneficial in reducing negative affect than the other groups (Kross 
& Ayduk, 2005).  
This line of research indicates that abstract thought, possibly in combination with 




clearly maps onto higher-levels of goal processing by asking participants to examine the 
reasons underlying their feelings. However, there also seems to be a concrete level of 
processing present. Although the distanced perspective asks individuals to step back from 
their experiences, it also asks them to “watch the conflict unfold as if it were happening 
all over again to the distant you.” In so doing, the individual recalling the experience will 
need to think at a relatively concrete level to recall actions, feelings, and sensations in the 
memory. In contrast, a purely abstract condition would ask participants to simply recall 
the general meaning of the event without stepping through the details. Therefore, the 
distanced analytic perspective seems to move participants back and forth between 
abstract and concrete levels of processing. As the study demonstrated that this distanced 
analytic condition was the most beneficial perspective, it suggests that combining abstract 
and concrete thought can be a useful tool in improving mood, and most likely rumination. 
Kross and Ayduk have since conducted several more studies and in recent reviews, the 
authors argue that their research demonstrates that the distanced analytic condition is 
useful in reducing rumination as well as negative affect (Ayduk & Kross, 2010; Kross & 
Ayduk, 2011).  
Further support for the possible benefits of some types of higher-level, abstract 
processing comes from the work of Rude et al. (2011). Rude and colleagues have 
suggested that a key component to the harmful effects of rumination is negative 
evaluation (Rude, Maestas, & Neff, 2007). Building on this premise, Rude et al. (2011) 
examined the conditions in the Watkins experiments and concluded that the abstract 




some of Watkins experiments this has been explicit, such as examining a romantic break 
up and asking participants to think (“At that moment, you stare at the table and 
contemplate your empty…”) from either a concrete- experiential (“glass”) or an abstract-
evaluative way (“life”) (Watkins, Moberly, and Moulds, 2008, p. 371). At other times, 
the evaluation may have been implicit, such as asking participants to “write about what 
reasons might have caused you to perform as you did” following a failure task (Watkins, 
2004, p. 1043).  
To test their hypothesis that the harmful effects of abstract thinking may result 
from evaluation, Rude et al. (2011) attempted to experimentally separate the level of 
construal and evaluative dimensions. The study asked participants to recall a rejection 
experience and then write from one of three perspectives: abstract-evaluative (e.g., “Why 
do you think this happened?”), abstract-contextual (e.g., “How do you think you will 
view this event in 1 to 2 years?”), concrete-experiential (e.g., “As you recall the event, 
what physical sensations do you experience in your body?”). Additionally, the study 
included a non-writing control condition. The findings indicated that the abstract-
contextual conditions showed a reduction in rumination over the no writing control and 
the abstract-evaluative condition. The abstract-evaluative condition did not show a 
significant difference from the control conditions. The findings also indicated that the 
concrete-experiential condition experienced less rumination than the no writing control. 
Therefore, the results from this study corroborated Watkins’ contention that concrete 
processing decreases rumination, but also differ from Watkins in that the results 




Possible Benefits of Combining Abstract and Concrete Thought  
Based on the literature reviewed thus far, it is apparent that there is a discrepancy 
in the field. Watkins and colleagues (2008) argue that abstract processing increases 
rumination when examining negative content. On the other hand, several empirical 
studies suggest some types of abstract thought are beneficial in reducing rumination (e.g., 
Rude et al., 2011). More research is needed to help clarify whether abstract thought has a 
beneficial or detrimental effect on rumination and mood levels. In addition, no study has 
explicitly examined the effects of mixing beneficial abstract thought and concrete thought 
when examining negative content. An interest of this study was to explore whether 
including abstract thought in interventions would be beneficial or harmful to rumination 
outcomes. In order to examine this interest, an exploration of values was selected as a 
type of abstract processing that might reduce rumination when combined with concrete 
processing.  
This next section outlines the theoretical basis for utilizing a mixed intervention. 
First, arguments from Control Theory are presented that suggest a focus on the abstract 
improves consistency across a variety of situations, encourages personal meaning, and 
directs concrete action (Carver & Scheier, 1998). Next, examples of beneficial types of 
abstract and concrete thought used in various psychotherapies are examined. Finally, 
possible beneficial mechanisms of combining an exploration of abstract values with 




Theoretical Benefits of a Mixed Perspective from Control Theory  
Control Theory (Carver and Scheier, 1990) provides a theoretical basis for 
understanding the benefits of combining the abstract and the concrete levels of thought. 
Recall that Control Theory purports that people self-regulate behavior, including mental 
activities, through a feedback loop. Within this loop, present actions and states are 
compared to salient goals or values. When a present state does not match the individual’s 
values, the individual acts in a way to reduce the discrepancy. Subsequently, the new 
current state is checked against reference values, thus completing the loop. In addition, 
recall that reference values fall along a hierarchy.  The top levels in the hierarchy guide 
the lower levels. The lower levels contain specific behavior scripts for acting in line with 
the more abstract principles.  
Based on this model, we can theorize several benefits to focusing on the abstract 
level in conjunction with the concrete level. Control Theory posits that higher-level, 
abstract values are consistent across situations, encourage personal meaning, and ensure 
that lower-level actions remain directed toward what is important (Carver & Scheier, 
1998). Without some attention to higher-level abstract values, people would lack 
consistency. Research indicates that individuals who think about the larger meaning of 
their actions are more organized, whereas concrete processing has been associated with 
more impulsivity (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). For instance, Wegner et al. (1986) 
measured the level of detail present in participants’ descriptions of their behaviors and 
provided bogus personality feedback. Individuals who concentrated on the details were 




than individuals who thought at a more abstract, conceptual level. This study highlights 
that abstract perspectives provide greater continuity.  
Abstract values and goals are also important for organizing meaningful action. 
Recall that Goal Progress Theory, a form of Control Theory, describes rumination as 
resulting when an individual perceives an experience as thwarting progress toward an 
important higher-level goal (Martin and Tesser, 2006). Furthermore, an individual can 
escape rumination by resuming progress toward, disengaging from, or finding alternate 
means for achieving a particular higher-level goal or value (K. Millar, Tesser, & M. 
Millar, 1988). Carver and Scheier (1998) suggest that more connections between the 
multiple levels of the hierarchy and greater flexibility in perspective are desired when 
dealing with problematic situations. This allows for the discovery of more ways to 
achieve one’s goals and facilitates organized action. Consequently, an explicit focus on 
abstract values, combined with an alternative concrete means to achieve them, might 
enable the resumption of goal progress, and thereby, reduce rumination.  
Examples of Benefits of a Mixed Perspective from Clinical Theories 
 Many forms of psychotherapy utilize abstract thought to target rumination and 
depression. An examination of all the various psychotherapy theories is beyond the scope 
of this study. However, a brief inspection of a few clinical theories may provide examples 
of types of abstract thinking that are beneficial when used with concrete thought.  
Abstract thought used in clinical practice may take the form of increasing 
understanding, searching for meaning, or clarifying values. Psychoanalytic theories have 




life. This understanding often asks clients to make connections at an abstract level, such 
as examining defenses, internalized objects, or repetition of relationship patterns (Ainslie, 
2007). Therapies can also be more explicit in their direction toward abstraction. For 
example, existential therapists believe that it is beneficial to help clients face big picture 
questions and to explore meaning (e.g., Logotherapy, Frankl, 1992; Existential 
Psychotherapy, Yalom, 1980). Even cognitive therapy, with its emphasis on specific 
thoughts and feelings, delves into more abstract concepts such as core beliefs (Beck, 
2002). In fact, some cognitive theorists believe that an ability to use abstraction allows 
clients to see the underlying context of events, thus reducing rumination (James, Reichelt, 
Carlsonn, & McAnaney, 2008). Therefore, most theories combine some level of abstract 
level thinking with concrete thinking in order to understanding events and thoughts.  
 One type of abstract thought that holds promise for use in the present study is an 
exploration of values. Many theories purport that discovering abstract values and living 
in accordance with them has a therapeutic effect. In Motivational Interviewing (MI; 
Miller & Rollnick, 2002), a client-centered therapy, clients are encouraged to examine 
their current choices in comparison to all their values. Helping clients examine abstract 
values allows them to make choices that will reduce discrepancy and improve overall 
well-being (Wagner & Sanchez, 2002). Frankl (1992), speaking from an existential 
perspective, describes values as providing meaning and purpose. Frankl contended that 
when armed with this meaning, an individual could endure any of life’s hardships 
(Frankl, 1992). More recently, Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, 




global desired life consequences” (p.206). Within this theory, discovering one’s values 
and living in accordance with them is key to reducing psychological distress. Of note, 
with perhaps the exception of Frankl’s existential perspective, these examples use 
abstract values to guide concrete actions. Therefore, these theories ask individuals to 
traverse the goal hierarchy and employ a mixture of concrete and abstract thought. 
Possible Beneficial Mechanisms of a Mixed Perspective 
Combining an exploration of abstract values with concrete processing could 
theoretically decrease rumination through several mechanisms. An exploration of values 
was selected as a possible type of beneficial abstract thought because it maps directly 
onto the higher levels of the goal hierarchy and is believed to have therapeutic value. In 
fact, the values exploration task used in this study was adapted from several clinical 
theories including Dialectical Behavioral Therapy and Acceptance and Commitment 
Therapy (Davidov, Schmidt, & Schwartz, 2008; ACT, Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999; 
Linehan, 1993, 2010). Appendix A.7 displays the actual list of values that participants 
were asked to explore in terms of a negative event. Recall that Carver and Scheier (1990) 
label the highest level of the hierarchy as principles, which “are not specifications of acts 
but of qualities that can be manifested in many acts,” such as “honesty and 
responsibility” (p. 20). The values that participants were asked to explore in the present 
study, such as “spirituality,” “achievement,” and “connection with others,” were clearly 
in line with these more abstract, higher levels of thinking. Thus, we can be certain that 




One way that exploring values may reduce rumination is by increasing goal 
organization and helping people live more in terms of their values. Control Theory 
(Carver and Scheier, 1990) suggests that abstract thought guides lower-level actions, 
reduces impulsivity, and provides consistency (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989; Carver & 
Scheier, 1998). Therefore, an explicit knowledge of which higher-level values are 
thwarted, may allow an individual mired in rumination and depression to organize 
concrete actions toward the higher-level goal. Furthermore, moving between abstract and 
concrete levels could make connections between higher-level goals/values and concrete 
actions more salient. As a result, alternative means of achieving important goals/values 
might be more accessible. Several studies demonstrate that finding alternative ways to 
fulfill abstract goals reduces rumination (Koole et al. 1999; Martin & Tesser, 2006; K. 
Millar, Tesser, & M. Millar, 1988). Consequently, an exploration of values may help 
people act more consistently with their higher-level goals and values, and thereby, reduce 
rumination.  
Another way in which combining abstract values with concrete thought might 
reduce rumination is through encouraging greater personal meaning. According to 
Control Theory, abstract goals by definition are more important than concrete goals 
(Carver & Scheier, 1998). Therefore, explicitly connecting concrete actions to abstract 
values may increase the importance of actions and thus increase meaning. Greater 
personal meaning is associated with lower levels of rumination (Michael & Snyder, 
2005) and lower levels of depression (Mascaro & Rosen, 2008; Westerhof, Bohlmeijer, 




Although rumination and meaning-making appear related, the exact nature of the 
relationship is unclear. For example, Michael & Snyder (2005) surveyed 158 college 
students who had experienced the death of a loved one. They discovered that rumination 
mediated the relationship between meaning-making and well-being, indicating that 
rumination might explain the extent to which people can make sense of negative events. 
On the other hand, Kross and Ayduk (2011) contend that their self-distanced conditions 
work because it facilitates meaning, which in turn reduces rumination. It is possible that 
the constructs have a reciprocal relationship – rumination may inhibit the ability to make 
meaning out of negative experiences, but the inability to find meaning may also increase 
rumination about a negative experience.  
Finally, the degree of negative self-judgment may help explain the beneficial 
aspects of mixing an exploration of abstract values with concrete processing. Recall that 
Rude et al. (2011) compared four conditions: abstract-evaluative, abstract-contextual, 
concrete-experiential, and control conditions. Their findings indicated that participants in 
the abstract-contextual condition had a greater reduction in rumination than the abstract-
evaluative and the control condition. The authors argued that, by helping participants 
adopt a broader perspective, self-judgment was reduced in the abstract-contextual 
condition, which in turn decreased the level of rumination. An exploration of values may 
also be a form of abstract thinking that can help individuals understand negative events in 




In summary, an exploration of values combined with concrete processing may be 
a helpful perspective in reducing rumination by (1) using values to organize concrete 
thoughts and actions, (2) enhancing meaning, and (3) reducing negative self-judgment. 
Study Aims and Hypotheses 
 Two decades of research suggest that rumination has a significant role in the 
vulnerability to, and prediction of, depression. As such, researchers target rumination as a 
possible means to prevent and reduce depression. Recent evidence demonstrates that 
interventions that encourage thinking at a concrete level reduce rumination. However, 
theory, research, and clinical practice suggest there may be types of abstract thought that 
are beneficial.  This study investigated whether combining abstract thinking with 
concrete thinking would reduce rumination or exacerbate it. 
 Participants were asked to examine negative events in their lives from one of 
three perspectives: 1) concrete, 2) mixed, or 3) control. As a combination of abstract and 
specific thought has not yet explicitly been explored, this study included a mixed 
condition that asked clients to examine abstract values and connect them with specific 
actions. This study also included a concrete condition, which was based on Watkins’ 
concreteness training (Watkins, Baeyens, & Read, 2009). Finally, a control condition was 
included, which referenced negative events but did not encourage the adoption of a 
particular perspective.  
Study Aim 1 
The first aim of this study was to evaluate the effects of the conditions on 




found that concrete conditions outperform control conditions in decreasing rumination 
(Moberly & Watkins, 2006; Rude et al., 2009; Watkins, Baeyens, & Read, 2009). 
Therefore, a similar pattern was expected in this study. The mixed condition was 
hypothesized to have the benefits of the concrete condition and also the benefits of non-
evaluative abstract thought. In addition, the mixed condition was hypothesized to have 
more organized connections between the levels of the goal hierarchy. Therefore, the 
mixed condition was expected to demonstrate a greater reduction in rumination than both 
the concrete and control conditions. Participants completed measures of rumination, 
OGM, and depression immediately before receiving the intervention (Time 1), post-
intervention (Time 2), and at a month follow-up (Time 3).  
Hypothesis 1a: Effects of the Intervention on Rumination, OGM, and Depression 
Participants in the mixed condition will display decreased rumination, OGM, and 
depression at post-intervention (Time 2) and at follow up (Time 3) compared to 
participants in the concrete and control conditions. 
Hypothesis 1b: Effects of the Intervention on Rumination, OGM, and Depression 
Participants in the concrete condition will display decreased rumination, OGM, 
and depression post-intervention (Time 2) and at follow up (Time 3) compared to 
participants in the control conditions. 
Study Aim 2 
The second aim of the study explored which mechanisms of abstract thought are 
beneficial in reducing rumination. It was suggested that one of the possible beneficial 




Recently, Wilson et al. (2010) investigated a similar construct, called valued-living. They 
developed the Valued-Living Questionnaire, which was designed to evaluate the extent to 
which people live consistently with their values. This measure was used to operationalize 
the extent to which participants’ actions match the abstract values they discuss. In 
addition, it was theorized that abstract thought that creates greater personal meaning 
would reduce rumination. Consequently, the Meaning Making Scale, a measure 
examining the amount of meaning generated from negative events, was administered. 
Finally, lowering negative self-judgment was considered by Rude et al. (2011) to be a 
factor that helped decrease rumination. Thus, the KIMS, which measures self-judgment 
about negative events, was administered as well.  
Hypothesis 2: The Mediation by Valued-living, Meaning, and Self-Judgment.  
Valued-living, personal meaning, and self-judgment will each partially mediate 
the effects of contrasts between the mixed and the concrete and the mixed and the control 





Figure 2. Mediation of the treatment differences on rumination. Two different 
comparisons were examined for each mediation model: The mixed condition vs. the 
concrete condition and the mixed condition vs. the control condition. 
Study Aim 3  
The third aim of the study was to explore whether a reduction in rumination by 
the treatments would account for a reduction in cognitive styles related to rumination. 
Rumination is thought to be one of the mechanisms that contributes to OGM, a cognitive 
style that serves as a marker for depression vulnerability (Williams et al., 2007). 
Therefore, this study examined if rumination explained (i.e., mediated) any effects of the 















Hypothesis 3: Rumination Mediates the Effects of the Interventions on Overgeneral 
Autobiographical Memory  
It is hypothesized that rumination will mediate the effects of the treatments on 
OGM assessed at post-intervention (Time 2) and at follow up (Time 3) as shown in 
Figure 3. Specifically, it is predicted that participants in the mixed and concrete treatment 
conditions will display a reduction in rumination, which in turn will be associated with a 
decrease in OGM. 
 
Figure 3. Mediation of the treatment difference on OGM by rumination.  
Study Aim 4 
The final aim of this study was to determine if a reduction in rumination caused 
by the treatment effects, partially explained any reduction in depressive symptoms. 
Empirical evidence demonstrates rumination is concurrently associated with depression, 
that rumination predicts the onset and severity of depression, and when experimentally 
induced, rumination exacerbates sad mood (e.g., Butler & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1994; 
Harrington & Blankenship, 2002; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001). Therefore, this study examined 
if this intervention was useful in reducing depression through reductions in rumination. 
Consequently, participants completed a measure of depressive symptoms pre-treatment 







Hypothesis 4: Rumination Mediates the Effect of the Treatment on Depressive Symptoms 
 It is predicted that rumination will partially mediate the effects of the treatment on 
depressive symptoms at Time 2 and Time 3 as shown in Figure 4. Specifically, 
participants in the mixed and concrete conditions will be expected to display a decrease 
in rumination at Time 2 and Time 3 compared to the control condition, which in turn will 
















 Study participants were college students enrolled in undergraduate educational 
psychology courses and were recruited through the University of Texas at Austin’s 
Department of Educational Psychology subject pool in the fall of 2011. Participants were 
selected based on a minimum level of trait rumination. Two prescreening questions asked 
participants to endorse either “yes -- true of me” or “no – not true of me” to the following 
two statements: “I often think about recent situations wishing they could have gone 
better” and “I often analyze recent events to try to understand why I feel sad.”  
Participants who responded, “yes -- true of me” to either of the questions were eligible 
for the study. Participants received course credit in return for study participation. A total 
of 300 students were assigned by the department.  
 Of the 300 students assigned to the study, 48 were not included in the final 
analysis. Nineteen students did not participate in the first session. Reasons given by 
participants for missing the first session included dropping the class and scheduling 
difficulties. An additional four participants were removed because they missed more than 
one intervention session. The decision to allow students to miss only one of the four 
sessions was a compromise designed to maintain the overall strength of the interventions 
while allowing participants some flexibility. The remaining 25 participants were removed 
due to inaccuracy in their responses. At the end of the study, participants were asked, 




thoughtful were you in completing the writings?” Twenty-one participants responded 
either “not at all thoughtful” or “not at all honest” and were removed from further 
analysis. Finally, three participants were not included due to problematic patterns of 
responding. For example, for all items in CES-D, they would respond “most or all of the 
time,” including reverse coded items, indicating that they both “felt sad” and “felt happy” 
most or all of the time. After removing ineligible participants, the final number used in 
analysis was 252. 
 For this final sample of 252 participants, 71% were women and the mean age was 
20.93 (SD = 2.90). The university classification of the sample was 8.7% freshmen, 14.3% 
sophomores, 29% juniors, 45.2% seniors, and 1.6% graduate students. Participants 
indicated that they belonged to the following ethnic/racial categories: 6.7% African-
American/ Black, 22.6% Hispanic/Latino, .4% Native-American, 22.5% Asian, 41.4% 
Caucasian/European American, 1.2% Middle Eastern/Arab, 3.2% Multiracial, and 1.6% 
other.  
This study was in compliance with the guidelines set forth by the Institutional 
Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects at the University of Texas at Austin. 
The study received approval from the Institutional Review Board for the data collection 
beginning August 2011. 
Measures 
The Ruminative Response Scale (RRS; Hoeksema & Nolan, 1991) is one of the 
most frequently used instruments for measuring rumination and asks respondents to focus 




(e.g., “Think about your feelings of fatigue and achiness”), or consequences of the 
depressive mood (e.g., ‘‘think ‘I won’t be able to do my job/work because I feel so 
badly’”). The items are scored 1 (Never), 2 (Sometimes), 3 (Often), or 4 (Almost 
Always). The RRS was selected for the current study based on its wide use in 
experimental research. Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1991) reported good internal 
consistency (α = .89) and predicative validity in terms of depression. Internal consistency 
in the current sample was high (Time 1 α =.93, Time 2 α =.94, and Time 3 α =.94).  
The Centers for Epidemiological Studies- Depression scale (CES-D; Radloff, 
1977) is a widely utilized instrument that consists of twenty items designed to measure 
depressive symptomatology in the general population. Respondents are asked to indicate 
the frequency of symptoms on a scale ranging from 0 (Rarely or none of the time) to 3 
(Most of the time). Radloff used a threshold score of 16 for the indication of clinically 
significant depression.  Internal consistency using coefficient alpha is estimated to be .85 
for the community samples and .90 in clinical samples (Radloff, 1977). The CES-D 
demonstrated good internal consistency in the present sample (α =.89, α =.90, and α 
=.91).  
Autobiographical Memory Task (AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 1986) is the most 
prominent procedure for measuring overgeneral autobiographical memory. The AMT 
procedure asks respondents to retrieve specific memories based on a presented cue word. 
A list of twelve cue words was presented in each of the three time periods. The lists 
contained six positive words (e.g., happy) and six negative words (e.g., failure) (Pollock 




Williams, 2000). Three different lists of 12 words were used and counterbalanced in 
order for Time 1, Time 2, and Time 3. In a review of current autobiographical memory 
research, Williams (2007) found that there is not a significant correlation between 
outcome and the number of words. In addition, Williams found the AMT phenomenon 
seems to occur regardless of the particular cues. The current study uses a computerized 
version of the AMT (Rekart, Mineka, & Zinbarg, 2006). The procedure for the 
computerized version allows participants unlimited time to respond to cues. Some 
advantages of the computerized version are the standardization of the presentation of cues 
and greater participant privacy without an experimenter in the room. The instructions for 
the computerized version of the AMT were presented in a video and in text format with 
the following instructions (based on Rekart et al., 2006): 
This next section will ask you to remember specific events in your life. Twelve 
words will be displayed on the computer screen, one at a time. For each word 
displayed you will be asked to think of a specific personal memory that is 
associated with the word. The event could have happened recently (yesterday, last 
week) or a long time ago (when you were twelve). It might be a big event, or a 
trivial event. The important thing is that the memory be about a specific event. So, 
if the word “fun” were displayed on the computer screen, it would be correct to 
type “I celebrated my 21st birthday in Mexico.” However, responding, “I always 
enjoy a good party” would not be okay, as it does not mention a specific event. 




event for each cue word or phrase. Please aim for a sentence or two for each 
word. 
The memory you type should be a single event lasting no more than one 
day. For each word displayed try to come up with a memory within 60 seconds 
and then write it down in a sentence or two. There will be 12 words in total. It is 
key that you enter your responses to all twelve words in one sitting. Therefore, if 
you need a break, please take one before starting this next section.  
Coding AMT Responses. Four research assistants, who were blind to condition, 
coded participants’ responses as specific or nonspecific memories. Memories were coded 
as specific if the event lasted less than a day. For example, in response to the cue word 
“happy,” a specific response would be “I was happy when I signed the paperwork for my 
first car.” Non-specific memories were coded as a) a categorical memory (e.g., going to 
school every day when I was a child), b) an extended memory (e.g., “My vacation in 
Costa Rica.”), c) a semantic association (e.g., “This makes me think of my best friend.”), 
d) an omission (e.g., “I can’t think of anything”), or e) a repeated memory. Raters were 
trained to code the AMT responses through coding of practice responses. Once high 
inter-rater agreement was achieved with sample responses, coders each coded 25% of the 
actual response from the study. In addition to the 25%, all coders coded that same subset 
(540 responses) to determine inter-rater reliability. Inter-rater reliability was good with 
kappa statistics ranging from .79 to.89 for each pair of coders. 
Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills (KIMS) (Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004) is 




Describe, Act with Awareness, Accept without Judgment. In the proposed study only the 
Accept without Judgment scale was used. This consists of 9-items on a 5-point Likert-
style scale. Items were scored 1 (Never or very rarely true), 2 (Rarely true), 3 (Sometimes 
true), 4 (Often true), and 5 (Very often true or almost always true). Additionally, 
instructions from the original KIMS were altered to focus on thinking about negative 
events rather than a global assessment of self. The total for the Accept without Judgment 
subscale can be obtained by summing the scores for the items. Baer et al. (2004) found 
good internal consistency for the Accept without Judgment Scale with an alpha 
coefficient of .87. The KIMS demonstrated good internal consistency in the present 
sample (Time 2 α =.90 and Time 3 α =.90). 
The Meaning-Making Scale (MMS; van den Heuvel, Demerouti, Schreurs, 
Bakker, & Schaufeli, 2009) is designed to measure the extent to which individuals find 
meaning in adverse events. The MMS consists of seven items that range from strongly 
agree (1) to strongly disagree (6). The MMS was selected over other scales that measure 
meaning of life (e.g., Steger, Frazier, Oishi, & Kaler, 2006) because the scale measures 
meaning drawn from negative events. Van den Heuvel et al. (2009) found Cronbach’s 
alpha to be .78. The MMS demonstrated adequate internal consistency in the present 
sample (Time 2 α =.78 and Time 3 α =.77).  
The Valued-Living Questionnaire (VLQ; Wilson, Sandoz, Kitchens, & Roberts, 
2010) is an instrument designed to measure the extent that individuals’ actions are 
consistent with what they value. It consists of 20-items divided into two 10-item sections. 




(e.g., family relationships, spirituality) on a 10-point Likert-style scale, ranging from 1 
(not at all important) to 10 (extremely important). The second section asks respondents to 
rate how consistently they act in accordance with the same life domains on a 10-point 
scale, ranging from 1(not at all consistent) to 10 (extremely consistent). An importance 
score can be obtained by summing the scores from the first section. Similarly, a 
consistency score can be obtained by summing the items from the second section. This 
study used the composite score, which is obtained by taking the mean of the products of 
the score from the first and second sections on each of the ten domains. The VLQ 
composite demonstrated good internal consistency in the present sample (Time 2 α =.81 
and Time 3 α =.85). 
Procedure 
Overview 
The study utilized a repeated measures design with a single between subjects 
factor. The between factor was comprised of three conditions that asked participants to 
write from a particular perspective. The within factor contained three measurement times: 
Time 1 (pre-intervention), Time 2 (post-intervention), and Time 3 (a two week follow-
up). All measures and writing sessions were administered via a web-based data collection 
tool at a location of the participant’s choosing. Subjects were assigned to the study by the 
Department of Educational Psychology subject pool and were contacted by the principal 
investigator through email.  
The initial email introduced the study and contained a link to the first session 




provided informed consent and completed pre-intervention measures (RSS, CES-D, and 
AMT). Participants were then randomly assigned to one of the three conditions, and 
wrote about a bothersome experience they had been thinking about recently. Writing 
instructions encouraged a particular perspective based on condition assignment. 
Participants wrote from this same perspective in three additional sessions over the next 
two weeks. In the session (Time 2) that followed the writing interventions, participants 
again completed the same measures as at Time 1 (RRS, CES-D, and AMT) and 
additional measures (VLQ, MMS, and KIMS). Finally, to examine the stability of any 
treatment effects, a two-week follow-up (Time 3) was conducted. Time 3 contained the 










Figure 5. Study design and order of measures. MMS = Meaning Making Scale, RRS = 
Ruminative Response Scale, VLQ = Valued Living Questionnaire – Composite Score, 
KIMS = Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness – Accept without Judgment Scale, CES-D= 
Center for Epidemiological Studies- Depression Scale, AMT = Autobiographical 
Memory Test - number of specific memories. The intervention phase involved writing 
about a bothersome event four times over a two-week period.  
Intervention Conditions  
The conditions attempted to elicit thinking about negative experiences at different 
levels of abstraction. The concrete conditions encouraged participants to focus their 
attention on relatively specific levels of thinking. The mixed condition combined both 
Ss prescreened for trait rumination are 
assigned by the EDP subject pool 
  
Ss complete RRS, 
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abstract and concrete thinking and asked participants to relate abstract values to concrete 
details. In addition, a control condition was included that asked participants to think 
about a negative event but did not manipulate the level of abstraction.  
The Concrete Condition. The concrete condition was based on a modified version 
of Watkins’ concreteness training (Moberly & Watkins, 2006; Watkins, Baeyens, & 
Read, 2009). Similar to the Watkins, Baeyens, and Read (2009) study, there were three 
areas that the instructions addressed: (a) sensory details of the moment, (b) noticing the 
situation surrounding the event and the process of how events and behaviors unfold, and 
(c) finding alternative actions to address negative feelings. The actual computer prompts 
proceeded as follows: 
• Negative experiences happen often and can take many forms. Examples of 
negative experiences can include romantic breakups, an argument with a friend, a 
bad grade on an important test, loss of a loved one, money concerns, a problem 
with family, or any other event that bothers you or keeps coming up in your 
thoughts. This next section will ask you to write about negative experiences in 
your life. Try to think about the most bothersome negative experience that has 
been on your mind recently. The experience could have happened at any time as 
long as you were thinking about it within the last week.  
• Please write a brief phrase to describe the negative experience you are thinking 
about. 
• When	  you	  think	  about	  this	  experience,	  how	  bothersome	  is	  it?	  (Ratings	  were	  




• Please rate how frequently you have been thinking about this event in the last 
week.	  (Ratings	  were	  on	  a	  5	  point	  Likert	  scale). 
• Go back to the experience in your mind. Please describe your thinking and 
feelings as events unfolded as extensively as you can. Please write the equivalent 
of a medium to long paragraph (7-8 sentences/phrases).  
• Go back to the experience and focus on the sensory details in the moment of the 
negative experience. For example, you might focus on what things felt like or the 
temperature in the room when you took certain actions. Other sensations might be 
what you could smell, see, or hear. Write about some of the sensations you 
remember moment to moment during the experience. Please try to think back and 
write as extensively as you can. Please write the equivalent of a medium to long 
paragraph (7-8 sentences/phrases).  
• What are some specific alternative actions you could take to change how you feel 
about this event? Please spend the next few minutes discussing alternatives and 
providing specific details as extensively as you can. Please write the equivalent of 
a medium to long paragraph (7-8 sentences/phrases).  
The Mixed Condition. The mixed condition initially asked participants to rate how 
important different values were to them. The computer displayed a list of values and 
examples of how one might interpret a particular value. For instance, the value of security 
lists a possible interpretation as: It is important to you to live in secure surroundings; to 
have a secure income and know how your needs will be met (See Appendix A.7 for a full 




(Davidov, Schmidt, & Schwartz, 2008; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999; Linehan, 2010). 
The names of values differed from those outlined in the Valued-Living Questionnaire to 
reduce differential group exposure. Participants placed a check mark next to any value 
that they deemed important. After selecting from the list of values, participants were 
asked to choose the four or five most important to them and drag them to a separate box. 
After participants completed this task, the computer displayed screens with the following 
prompts: 
• Negative experiences happen often and can take many forms. Examples of 
negative experiences can include romantic breakups, an argument with a friend, a 
bad grade on an important test, loss of a loved one, money concerns, a problem 
with family, or any other event that bothers you or keeps coming up in your 
thoughts. This next section will ask you to write about negative experiences in 
your life. Try to think about the most bothersome negative experience that has 
been on your mind recently. The experience could have happened at any time as 
long as you were thinking about it within the last week. 	  
• Please write a brief phrase to describe the negative experience you are thinking 
about. 
• When	  you	  think	  about	  this	  experience,	  how	  bothersome	  is	  it?	  (Ratings	  were	  
on	  a	  5	  point	  Likert	  scale). 
• Please rate how frequently you have been thinking about this event in the last 




• Think about the specific event. How does this negative event relate to the values 
that you listed as important to you?   Please focus your attention on how the 
experience makes you feel more distant from certain important values. For 
example, if your negative experience was poor test performance, you might focus 
on how this may have been an obstacle to your important value of achievement. 
In addition, if there were some ways in which the negative experience was 
consistent with certain values, you could add that too. 
As a reminder, some values that you listed as important were: (the screen 
displayed values that the participant had earlier endorsed). 
Please write the equivalent of a medium to long paragraph (7-8 sentences/phrases) 
in the box below. 
• For the values you just discussed in connection with the experience, what are 
some specific alternative ways that you could act in line with those values? What 
alternative actions could you take to make progress toward these values?  Please 
discuss actions you could take and provide specific details.  
As	  a	  reminder,	  some	  values	  that	  you	  listed	  as	  important	  were:	  (the	  screen	  
displayed	  values	  that	  the	  participant	  had	  earlier	  endorsed).	  
Please	  write	  the	  equivalent	  of	  a	  medium	  to	  long	  paragraph	  (7-­‐8	  
sentences/phrases)	  in	  the	  box	  below.	  
The Control Condition. Participants in the control condition were asked to think 




their typical Monday was like (the day varied from session to session). The actual 
computer prompts proceeded as follows: 
• Negative	  experiences	  happen	  often	  and	  can	  take	  many	  forms.	  Examples	  of	  
negative	  experiences	  can	  include	  romantic	  breakups,	  an	  argument	  with	  a	  
friend,	  a	  bad	  grade	  on	  an	  important	  test,	  loss	  of	  a	  loved	  one,	  money	  concerns,	  
a	  problem	  with	  family,	  or	  any	  other	  event	  that	  bothers	  you	  or	  keeps	  coming	  
up	  in	  your	  thoughts.	  This	  next	  section	  will	  ask	  you	  to	  write	  about	  negative	  
experiences	  in	  your	  life.	  Try	  to	  think	  about	  the	  most	  bothersome	  negative	  
experience	  that	  has	  been	  on	  your	  mind	  recently.	  The	  experience	  could	  have	  
happened	  at	  any	  time	  as	  long	  as	  you	  were	  thinking	  about	  it	  within	  the	  last	  
week.	  	  
• Please briefly describe the negative experience in a sentence or two. 
• When	  you	  think	  about	  this	  experience,	  how	  bothersome	  is	  it?	  (Ratings	  were	  
on	  a	  5	  point	  Likert	  scale). 
• Please rate how frequently you have been thinking about this event in the last 
week.	  (Ratings	  were	  on	  a	  5	  point	  Likert	  scale). 
• We	  are	  also	  interested	  in	  the	  types	  of	  activities	  students	  engage	  in.	  Please	  
write	  a	  paragraph	  describing	  your	  activities	  and	  schedule	  on	  a	  typical	  
Monday.	  Include	  possible	  activities	  that	  you	  might	  do	  both	  during	  the	  day	  
and	  in	  the	  evening.	  Please	  write	  the	  equivalent	  of	  a	  medium	  to	  long	  





In total, data collection lasted approximately one month and contained six 
different sessions (see Table 1). For each session, participants received an email with a 
link to study materials. Participants had a three day window in which to complete each 
session. Once the deadline for a session was reached, links to study material were no 
longer active. Twenty-four hours after a window closed, an email with a link to the next 
writing session was sent out (with the exception of the 2-week follow-up).  
Table 1 
Study Session Dates and Activities 






Session 1 (Time 1) Oct. 3, 2011 Oct. 6, 2011 Pre-measures and writing 
Session 2 Oct. 7, 2011 Oct. 10, 2011 Writing 
Session 3 Oct. 11, 2011 Oct. 14, 2011 Writing 
Session 4 Oct. 15, 2011 Oct. 18, 2011 Writing 
Session 5 (Time 2) Oct. 19, 2011 Oct. 22, 2011 Post-measures 






CHAPTER 4  
Results 
The aim of this study was to examine whether focusing on negative events from a 
mixed concrete and abstract perspective would be beneficial in reducing rumination. 
Participants were randomly assigned to write about a negative experience from one of 
three perspectives: mixed, concrete, or control. The specific hypotheses predicted that 
participants in the mixed condition would show a greater reduction in rumination, OGM, 
and depression than participants in the traditional concrete condition or the control 
condition. Additionally, hypotheses predicted that any reduction in rumination might be 
mediated by valued living, meaning making, and self-judgment. Finally, rumination was 
predicated to mediate any treatment differences in OGM or depression. 
Descriptive Statistics 
The means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations of the main study variables 
are presented in Table 2. All 252 eligible participants completed Time 1 measures. Not 
every participant completed both Time 2 and Time 3. Participants’ data were included in 
the subsequent analysis so long as said participants completed at least one of the post-
intervention sessions. This resulted in an n of 241 at Time 2, and an n of 250 participants 
at Time 3. The analyses for Time 2 and Time 3 outcomes were conducted separately in 








Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations of Study Variables  
Study 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. RRS 
Time 1 




  1 -.05 .68** .71** -.13* .66** .64** .02 
3. AMT 
Time 1 
    1 -.04 -.08 .48** -.04 -.05 .47** 
4. RRS 
Time 2 




        1 -.08 .67** .76** .06 
6. AMT 
Time 2 
          1 -.05 -.07 .58** 
7. RRS 
Time 3 




              1 -.03 
9. AMT 
Time 3 
                1 
n 252	   252	   251	   241	   241	   241	   248	   248	   247	  
M 45.04 18.61 7.95 43.42 17.61 7.71 41.66 17.05 7.67 
SD 11.46 9.93 3.01 12.26 10.08 3.22 12.04 10.30 3.07 
Note. CES-D= Center for Epidemiological Studies- Depression Scale, AMT = Autobiographical Memory 
Test - Number of Specific Memories, RRS = Ruminative Response Scale. **. Correlation is significant at 
the .01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Sample Characteristics 
Analysis of Removed Cases 
Of the 281 participants who were originally assigned to the study and completed 
Time 1, 252 were included in the final analysis. As detailed in the methods section, 29 
participants did not meet the inclusion criteria based on either the number of writing 




to complete the minimum number of writing sessions, three were removed from the 
mixed condition and one was removed from the control condition. An examination of the 
initial scores did not reveal any extreme characteristics for these participants. For the 25 
participants who were removed for providing inaccurate data (see the methods section for 
criteria), eight were removed from the control condition, seven were removed from the 
experiential condition, and eleven were removed from the mixed condition. To evaluate 
possible differences in those who were removed from the study for inaccuracy and those 
included in the analysis, separate ANOVA and chi-squared analyses were conducted on 
demographic variables and baseline measures. There were no significant differences 
based on Sex (χ2 (1, N = 274) = 0.03, p = .98), age (p = .45), or class (χ2 (4, N = 271) = 
1.02, p = .90). Examination of baseline measures also revealed no significant differences 
in initial rumination level (F(1, 272) = 1.48, p = .23) or depression (F(1, 272) = .04, p = 
.85) between those removed and those retained in the analysis. Of note, some removed 
participants could not be included in some of these analyses because their baseline 
measure of rumination and depression were inaccurate, or they missed the last session, 
which contained the demographic questions.  
A check was also conducted for participants who were retained in the analysis but 
missed Time 2. These eleven participants were compared to participants who completed 
Time 2 on baseline measures. ANOVAs revealed no differences in initial levels of 
rumination (F(1, 250) = .72, p = .40), depression (F(1, 250) = .71, p = .40), and OGM 




Tests of Initial Group Differences  
 Although participants were randomly assigned to the control condition (n = 90), 
the concrete condition (n = 88), and the mixed condition (n = 74), chi-square analyses 
and one-way ANOVAs were conducted to check for possible differences on demographic 
variables and baseline measures. There were no significant differences in demographic 
characteristics among the three conditions as shown in Table 3. Of note, the chi-squared 
test requires a cell count of 5 to be appropriate. Therefore, the chi-squared test comparing 
the race by condition comprises only racial categories with the minimum requirement in 
the analysis (i.e., Asian, White, and Hispanic). As displayed in Table 4, there were also 
no significant differences between the conditions on baseline measures of rumination, 
depression, and autobiographical memories (all p values > .17). 
Table 3 
Demographic and Baseline Characteristics by Intervention Group 
  Intervention Group  
Characteristic  Total  Control  Concrete  Mixed pa 
n  250  91  86  73  
Age M (SD), 
years 







Women (%)  71.00  77.8  67  67.6 .21 
Race          .20 
     Black  17  8  9  0  
    Hispanic  56  15  16  25  
Native-
American 




     Asian  57  16  17  24  
     White  103  43  34  26  
Middle  
Eastern 
 3  1  1  1  
Multi-
Racial 
 8  3  5  0  
     Other  4  0  3  1  
Classification          .18 
     Freshman  22  9  7  6  
     Sophomore  36  9  10  17  
     Junior  73  33  23  17  
     Senior  114  35  47  32  
     Graduate  4  2  1  1  
Note. a p is for intervention group comparisons with one-way ANOVAs or chi-square tests  
 
Table 4 
Baseline for Continuous Variables by Intervention Group 




M (SD)  
Control 
M (SD)  
Concrete 




CES-D  18.61 (9.92)  17.98   
(9.14) 
 18.53   
(10.81) 
 19.47   
(9.82) 
.63 
AMT  9.94 (3.01)  8.39 (2.79)  7.55 (3.20)  7.87 
(3.01) 
.17 







Note. CES-D= Center for Epidemiological Studies- Depression Scale, AMT = Autobiographical Memory 
Test - number of specific memories, RRS = Ruminative Response Scale.  




Examination of the Writing Component 
 Responses to the writing prompts were examined to provide greater understanding 
of the types of negative experiences about which participants wrote. Recall that each 
participant completed four writing sessions over the course of two weeks. The participant 
could choose to write about the same bothersome experience in each session or a 
different experience. In response to the prompt “When you think about this experience, 
how bothersome is it?”, participants gave a mean rating of 3.70 on a 5 point Likert scale, 
indicating that the average rating fell between “somewhat” and “very.” On average, 
participants gave a rating of 3.40 on a 5 point Likert scale as to how frequently they 
thought about the experience. This score fell between “somewhat” and “quite a lot.” The 
type of negative experience that the participants wrote about varied greatly. To provide a 
general sense of the types of experiences participants wrote about, I coded each 
description into one of eleven categories. Table 5 displays the number of participants who 
wrote about a particular category and examples of actual writing samples. Participants 
also varied in the number of different negative experiences that they wrote about: 39.7% 
of the sample wrote about the same experience in all four sessions, 27.8% wrote about 
two different experiences, 18.7% wrote about three different experiences, and 11.5% 
wrote about a different negative experience in every session. The mean length in number 
of characters for the control condition (M = 1094.08) was significantly less than the 
concrete condition (M= 3421.59), t(172) = 120.16,  p< .001,  and the mixed condition (M 
= 3455.76), t(158) = 128.08,  p< .001. The concrete and the mixed conditions did not 














36 3.6% “My roommate is moving out of my 





274 27.4% “My boyfriend of 2 years broke up with me 
last week. Next week is supposed to be our 
3 year anniversary.” 
Interactions with 
friends/peers 
97 9.7% “I didn’t get into a fraternity.” 
Academic  221 22.1% “I failed two of my CS courses last 
semester.” 
Death or illness 
of loved one 
61 6.1% “My cousin died recently, 6 days after my 
birthday and his death is really taking a toll 
on me. I have yet to find peace and I doubt 
I ever will.” 
Money related 35 3.5% “Went to Dallas for OU weekend and 
wasted money and time.” 
Family related 98 9.8% “I found out my dad cheated on my mom.” 
Work related 25 2.5% “My boss (and very good friend) was fired 
at work this week, and I became afraid for 
my own job security.” 
Trauma 
experience 
10 1.0% “My purse was stolen.” 




accident  jail.” 
Other 85 8.5% “I didn't understand my purpose in life.” 
Total 975   
Note. Participants may have written about the same experience in multiple sessions. Percentages reflect the 
total experiences, not the total unique experiences.  
 
AMT Preliminary Analyses  
Consistent with recent literature, the total number of specific memories generated 
on the AMT was used to measure overgeneral autobiographical memory in the current 
study (Williams et al., 2007). Recall that participants completed three different AMT 
word lists (Appendix A.8). To check the equality of the word lists, a one-way between 
groups ANOVA was conducted with word list as the independent factor and AMT 
specificity scores at Time 1 as the dependent variable. The difference between the mean 
Time 1 AMT scores across lists A (M = 7.85), B (M = 8.12), and C (M = 7.95) was not 
significant (p >.05), suggesting that the word lists can be considered equivalent. In 
addition, recall that within each condition, word lists were presented in counterbalanced 
order across Time 1, Time 2, and Time 3. The order was randomly assigned across 
groups. A chi-square test found that the order assigned did not differ by condition (χ2 (1, 
N = 252) = 2.49, p = .65). A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with time as a 
within factor and order as a between factor for AMT scores at Time 1, Time 2 and Time 
3. The interaction between Time and Order was not significant (p >.05), indicating that 




Examination of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1a: Effects of the Intervention on Rumination, OGM, and Depression 
It was hypothesized that participants in the mixed condition would display 
decreased rumination, OGM, and depression at approximately one day post-intervention 
(Time 2) and at the two-week follow-up (Time 3) compared to participants in the 
concrete and control conditions. 
Hypothesis 1b: Effects of the Intervention on Rumination, OGM, and Depression 
It was hypothesized that participants in the concrete condition would display 
decreased rumination, OGM, and depression post-intervention (Time 2) and at follow up 
(Time 3) compared to participants in the control conditions. 
Results for Hypothesis 1.  
Preliminary Analysis of Rumination, Depression, and OGM 
Prior to investigating outcomes a case analysis was conducted. An examination of 
z scores was conducted to check for univariate outliers for any of the variables (the 
criteria for an outlier was an absolute value greater than 3). Any value over three was 
examined to determine accuracy of response. Two cases had z scores over 3 on the Time 
1 RRS (highest 3.13). An examination of the responses for these participants revealed the 
data to be valid. Scatterplots were examined for influential bivariate outliers for the 
whole sample and by groups. No bivariate outliers were found for the CES-D and RRS. 
The AMT had several outliers in comparisons of both Time 1 by Time 2 and Time 1 by 
Time 3. However, a sensitivity analysis showed no change in significance based on 




rumination or depression in this sample (see Table 2). An exploration of histograms was 
conducted for each dependent variable alone and for each dependent variable by group. 
All histograms appeared normal. All absolute values of skew were less than .4 and 
kurtosis less than 1.0.  
Analytic Strategy 
To assess treatment differences between conditions at Time 2 and Time 3, a 
separate analysis was conducted for each dependent variable. The initial analytic strategy 
utilized ANCOVAs to control for Time 1 score and obtain adjusted means for each 
dependent variable at Time 2 and Time 3. The adjusted means were used to test the 
planned comparisons outlined in the hypothesis. This strategy was employed for 
rumination and OGM. However, for the depression outcome, an interaction was found 
between initial CES-D score and condition. As such, a regression analysis was conducted 
to decompose this interaction for both Time 2 and Time 3 outcomes. The following 
sections outline the analysis for each dependent variable in turn. Means and standard 






Means and Standard Deviations of Outcome Measures by Intervention Group at Times 1, 
2, and 3 
Intervention Group 
 Control  Concrete  Mixed 
 n M SD  n M SD  n M SD 
RRS            
Time 1 90 44.47 11.46   88 44.85 11.83   74 45.96 11.08 
Time 2 86 43.97 13.82   82 42.99 11.77   73 43.26 10.90 
Time 3 87 42.15 12.94   88 41.81 12.19   73 40.90 10.80 
CES-D                       
Time 1 90 17.98 9.14   88 18.53 10.81   74 19.47 9.82 
Time 2 86 16.52 11.05   82 18.09 10.20   73 18.34 8.67 
Time 3 87 16.49 10.91   88 17.99 10.72   73 16.59 9.02 
AMT                       
Time 1 89 8.39 2.79   88 7.56 3.20   74 7.88 3.02 
Time 2 86 8.34 2.54   82 7.41 3.47   73 7.32 3.57 
Time 3 86 7.67 3.00   88 7.49 3.08   73 7.89 3.16 
Note. CES-D= Center for Epidemiological Studies- Depression Scale, AMT = Autobiographical Memory 






An aim of the study was to determine if the mixed condition led to a significantly 
greater decrease in depression than the other two conditions and if the concrete condition 
led to a greater decrease than the control. To examine if there were treatment differences 
at Time 2 and Time 3, ANCOVA was originally considered as a statistical method to 
control for Time 1 CES-D. However, as discussed below, while testing the assumptions 
of an ANCOVA, a significant interaction was found between Time 1 CES-D score and 
condition. This indicates that the treatment differences depended on the initial level of 
depression. Thus, multiple regression was used to understand the nature of the 
interaction.  
Testing the Assumptions of ANCOVA and the Discovery of an Interaction. The 
assumptions of ANCOVA were examined for CES-D at Time 2 and Time 3. 
Independence, normality, linearity between the covariate and the dependent variable, and 
homogeneity of variance were all tenable. The procedure outlined by Stevens (2009, p. 
306) was used to test the assumption of homogeneity of the regression slopes, in which 
an interaction term between the covariate and treatment variable is included in the model. 
For CES-D at Time 2, a significant interaction was found between CES-D score at Time 
1 and condition (F(2, 235) = 6.16, p < .01). Similarly, for the CES-D at Time 3 
ANCOVA, an interaction was found between CES-D score at Time 1 and condition (F(2, 
242) = 3.78, p < .05). Based on these findings, the assumption of the homogeneity of the 
regression slopes was violated, and thus, ANCOVA was not an appropriate statistical test 




that the treatment effects worked differently depending on the initial level of depression. 
Figure 6 and Figure 7 demonstrate the interaction.  
 
Figure 6. Time 1 CES-D score by Time 2 CES-D score by condition. This figure shows 
fit lines by group for Time 1 CES-D score versus Time 2 CES-D score. CES-D= Center 







Figure 7. Time 1 CES-D score by Time 3 CES-D score by condition. This figure shows 
fit lines by group for Time 1 CES-D score versus Time 3 CES-D score. CES-D= Center 
for Epidemiological Studies- Depression Scale 
Analytic Strategy for Decomposing the Interactions. The interactions between 
initial CES-D score and condition for depression outcomes were decomposed using 
multiple regression analysis. In testing interactions with a continuous predictor, a 
commonly used procedure is to include the cross products of the predictor and moderator 
variables in a multiple regression analysis. To accomplish this, CES-D score at Time 1 




was then coded into two dummy variables, with the first dummy variable coded 1 for the 
concrete condition and the second dummy variable coded 1 for the mixed condition. Both 
dummy variables were multiplied by the centered CES-D score to create two interaction 
terms. In a first step in a sequential regression, the relevant outcome (Time 2 or Time 3 
CES-D score) was regressed on Time 1 CES-D score, dummy variable 1, and dummy 
variable 2. In the second step, the interaction terms were entered into the regression. The 
dummy variables were then recoded and a separate regression was run to check for 
interactions with the mixed-concrete contrast. Significant interactions were subjected to 
further analysis to find regions of significance.  For each analysis the assumptions of 
multiple regression were reassessed. 
In order to understand where the specific contrasts differed in terms of initial 
CES-D score, Johnson-Neyman Confidence Bands were calculated to find regions of 
significance. Another option would have been to decompose the interaction by picking a 
point based on theory, such as high or low depression. A disadvantage of the pick a point 
approach is that the selection of the point can be arbitrary. For example, in the case of 
CES-D, research has not established a definitive cut point for the presence of depression. 
In contrast, the Johnson-Neyman technique (Johnson & Fay, 1950; Johnson & Neyman, 
1936) allows the estimation of specific regions of a moderator (e.g., Time 1 CES-D) 
where the effects of the predictor (e.g., Mixed-Control Contrast) are significant on the 
outcome (e.g., Time 2 CES-D). Based on this advantage, the Johnson-Neyman technique 
was selected as a way to understand the interactions. To conduct the actual analysis, the 




Process syntax macro was utilized to calculate moderator values for significant regions 
(Hayes, 2012). A macro is an addition to SPSS written in syntax that defines a series of 
commands or calculations. Hayes (2012) includes documentation specifying the 
equations used in the macro. In cases where a region of significance was found, a range 
of effect sizes were calculated using Cohen’s d statistic. The square root of the mean 
square error for a one-way ANOVA with condition as an independent factor and the 
relevant depression score (Time 2 or Time 3) as a dependent factor provided the 
denominator for the calculations. The numerators were the lowest and highest effects in a 
significant region. 
Depression at Time 2. In the first step in a sequential regression, Time 2 CES-D 
score was regressed on Time 1 CES-D score, the concrete-control contrast (dummy 
variable 1), and mixed-control contrast (dummy variable 2). In the second step, the 
interaction terms were entered into the regression. The overall regression was significant 
(adjusted R2 = .52, F(5, 235) = 53.06, p <.001) and the inclusion of the interaction terms 
led to a significant change in R2 (ΔR2 =.03, F(2, 235) = 6.16, p < .01). Table 7 shows the 
results of the second step in the analysis and indicates that both the interactions were 
significant. This finding suggests that, depending on participants’ initial levels of 
depression, the mixed condition and concrete condition each had treatment effects on 
Time 2 CES-D compared to the control condition. The dummy variables were then 
recoded to test for an interaction between the initial CES-D score and the mixed-concrete 




contrast was not significant (p > .15). In addition, the mixed-concrete contrast by itself 
was also not a significant predictor of Time 2 CES-D score (p > .56).  
Table 7  
Regression Coefficients for the Prediction of Post Intervention (Time 2) CES-D Scores 
Note. CES-D = Center for Epidemiological Studies- Depression Scale, concrete-control (dummy 1) = the 
dummy coding for the contrast between the concrete and control conditions, mixed-control (dummy 2) = 
the dummy coding for the contrast between the mixed and control conditions.  
 
Depression at Time 2: Examination of the Mixed-Control by CES-D Interaction. 
Using the Process SPSS macro, Time 2 CES-D score was regressed on the mixed-control 
contrast, Time 1 CES-D score, and the interaction term. The overall regression was 
significant (R2 = .54, F(3, 155)= 60.72 , p <.001), and the inclusion of the interaction 
term led to a significant change in R2 (Δ R2 =.04 (F(1, 155)= 12.45, p < .001). This 
indicates that the interaction between initial CES-D score and the mixed-control contrast 
accounted for 4% of the variance in Time 2 CES-D score.  
The Johnson-Neyman technique found two moderator values defining 
significance regions: 15.18 and 28.52. Appendix B.1 displays conditional effects for 
specific values of Time 1 CES-D. For participants with Time 1 CES-D scores below 
15.18 (44.4% of the total sample), the mixed condition had higher levels of depressive 
symptoms than the control group. The effect size for the conditional effects in this 
 B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 17.00 0.75   22.55  < .001 
CES-D (Time 1) 0.94 0.08 0.92 11.52  < .001 
Concrete-Control (dummy 1) 1.43 1.08 0.07 1.33 .19 
Mixed-Control (dummy 2) 0.92 1.11 0.04 0.83 .41 
CES-D x Concrete-Control -0.25 0.11 -0.15 -2.23 .03 




significance region ranged from .23 to .76, which indicated that, depending on Time 1 
CES-D score, the unexpected adverse treatment effects of the mixed-control contrast 
ranged from small to large. For participants with Time 1 CES-D scores above 28.52 
(18.3% of the total sample), the mixed condition had significantly lower Time 2 CES-D 
scores than the control condition. Cohen’s d ranged from .35 to 1.08, which indicates 
small to large treatment effects.  
Depression at Time 2: Examination of the Concrete-Control by Initial CES-D 
Interaction. Using the Process SPSS syntax macro, Time 2 CES-D score was regressed 
on the concrete-control contrast, Time 1 CES-D, and the interaction term. The overall 
regression was significant (R2 = .57, F(3, 164)= 73.75 , p <.001), and the inclusion of the 
interaction terms led to a significant change in R2 (ΔR2 =.01 (F(1, 164)= 4.94, p < .05). 
This indicates that the interaction between initial CES-D score and the concrete-control 
contrast accounted for 1% of the variance in Time 2 CES-D score.  
The Johnson-Neyman technique found one moderator value defining a 
significance region: 15.44. For participants with Time 1 CES-D scores below 15.44 
(44.4% of the total sample), the concrete condition had higher levels of depressive 
symptoms than the control group as measured by Time 2 CES-D. Cohen’s d ranged from 
.22 to .58, which indicates small to medium effects. For participants with Time 1 CES-D 
scores above 15.44, the contrast was not significant.  
Depression at Time 3. As with Time 2, the interaction between initial CES-D 
score and condition was explored for Time 3 CES-D score using multiple regression. As 




CES-D score, the concrete-control contrast (dummy variable 1), and the mixed-control 
contrast (dummy variable 2). In the second step, the interaction terms were entered into 
the regression. The overall regression was significant (adjusted R2 = .42, F(5, 242)= 
37.14, p <.001), and the inclusion of the interaction terms led to a significant change in 
R2 (ΔR2 =.02, (F(2, 242)= 4.34, p <.05). Table 8 shows the results of the second step in 
the analysis and indicates that both interactions tested were significant. The dummy 
variables were recoded, and the interaction for the contrast between the mixed and 
concrete conditions was tested. The interaction for the concrete-mixed contrast and initial 
CES-D score was not significant (p = .75). The contrast between the mixed and concrete 
condition alone also did not significantly predict Time 3 CES-D score (p = .11).  
Table 8  
Regression Coefficients for the Prediction of 2-week Follow-Up (Time 3) CES-D Scores 
Note. CES-D = Center for Epidemiological Studies- Depression Scale, concrete-control (dummy 1) = the 
dummy coding for the contrast between the concrete and control conditions, mixed-control (dummy 2) = 
the dummy coding for the contrast between the mixed and control conditions.  
 
Depression at Time 3: Examination of the Mixed-Control by CES-D Interaction. 
The Johnson-Neyman technique was used to determine where treatment differences 
existed for the mixed-control contrast on Time 3 CES-D. Using the Process SPSS macro, 
Time 3 CES-D score was regressed on the mixed-control contrast, Time 1 CES-D score, 
 B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 17.11 0.84   20.33 < .001 
CES-D (Time 1) 0.89 0.09 0.86 9.68 < .001 
Concrete-Control (dummy 1) 0.93 1.19 0.04 0.78 .44 
Mixed-Control (dummy 2) -0.98 1.25 -0.04 -0.79 .43 
CES-D x Concrete- Control -0.30 0.12 -0.19 -2.53 .01 




and the interaction term. The overall regression was significant (R2 = .49, F(3, 156)= 
49.01 , p <.001), and the inclusion of the interaction terms led to a significant change in 
R2 (ΔR2 =.03, F(1, 156)= 7.93, p < .01). This indicates that the interaction between initial 
CES-D Score and the mixed-control contrast accounted for 3% of the variance in Time 3 
CES-D score.  
The Johnson-Neyman technique found two moderator values defining regions of 
significance: 2.63 and 23.11. For participants with Time 1 CES-D scores above 23.11 
(28% of the total sample), the mixed condition had significantly lower Time 3 CES-D 
scores than the control condition. The effect sizes for the mixed-control contrast on Time 
3 CES-D for this region of significance ranged from small to large (Cohen’s d = .24 to 
Cohen’s d = 1.07). For participants with Time 1 CES-D scores below 2.63 (0.8% of the 
total sample), the mixed condition had significantly higher Time 3 CES-D scores than the 
control condition. However, only two participants in the sample fell within this range, 
which makes the findings for this region uncertain. The control condition and the mixed 
condition did not significantly differ in depressive symptoms from Time 3 for 
participants with Time 1 CES-D scores between 2.63 and 23.11.  
Depression at Time 3: Examination of the Concrete-Control by CES-D 
Interaction. The significant interaction for the concrete-control contrast and initial CES-
D score was also examined. Time 3 CES-D score was regressed on the concrete-control 
contrast, Time 1 CES-D, and the interaction term using the Process SPSS macro. The 
overall regression was significant (R2 = .46, F(3, 170)= 47.87 , p <.001), and the 




6.09, p = .02). This indicates that the interaction between initial CES-D score and the 
concrete-control contrast accounted for 2% of the variance in Time 3 CES-D score.  
The Johnson-Neyman analysis returned two moderator values defining 
significance regions: 12.59 and 43.06. For participants with Time 1 CES-D scores below 
12.59 (33.3% of the total sample), the concrete condition had higher Time 2 CES-D 
scores than the control group. For this region of significance the effect sizes ranged from 
.27 to .61, which indicates small to medium effects. For participants with Time 1 CES-D 
scores above 43.06 (1.6% of the total sample), the concrete condition had significantly 
lower Time 3 CES-D scores than the control group. Because only 5 participants in the 
whole sample had scores above 43.06, the findings for this region are uncertain. Cohen’s 
d for this region ranged from .63 to .75, which indicates medium to large effect sizes. For 
participants with Time 1 CES-D scores between 12.59 and 43.06, the concrete-control 
contrast did not have a significant effect on Time 3 CES-D score.  
Moderator Values Compared with Commonly Used Cut points. Various cut points 
have been used to indicate depression, which range from 12 to 27. (Klinkman, Coyne, 
Gallo, & Schwenk, 1997; Lewinsohn, Seeley, Roberts, & Allen, 1997; Myers & 
Weissman, 1980; Radloff, 1977; Zich, Attkisson, & Greenfield, 1990). A recent study 
compared various cut points on the CES-D with DSM-IV criteria for depression in 
college populations. This study used the receiver operating characteristics (ROC) 
statistical procedure to determine the accuracy of the cut points in making a diagnosis of 
depression (Baldwin & Shean, 2008). The results suggested that, for college populations, 




Therefore, the moderating values found in the present study approximate the previously 
found cut values for low and high levels of depressive symptoms.  
Table 9 summarizes the results of the Johnson-Neyman analysis for depression 
outcomes and lists the moderator values. The table shows that the for individuals with 
low initial levels of depression both the mixed condition and concrete condition had 
significantly higher levels of depression than the control at the one-day post-intervention 
point. At the two-week follow-up, the concrete condition continued to have significantly 
higher levels of depression for a large portion of people with low-depression scores, but 
the mixed condition was only significant for conditional values below 2.63. Only two 
participants in the whole study fell below this point. For individuals with high levels of 
depression, the mixed condition led to reduced depression compared to the control at both 
post-intervention and the follow-up. The concrete condition did not differ significantly 
from the control post-intervention and only differed for extremely high depression scores 
at the two week follow-up. Of note, only five subjects fell in this range in the whole 






Table 9  













Mixed-Control Time 2 
CES-D 
15.18  Mixed > 
Control 













N.S. None N.S. None 
Mixed-Control Time 3 
CES-D 
2.63a Mixed >  
Control 






12.59  Concrete > 
Control 






N.S. None N.S. None 
Note. This table only displays a summary of the moderator values. N.S. = non-significant findings. a = a 
moderator value that defines a region of significance with very few participants. The 1st Moderator column 
indicates that a significant region exists for Time 1 CES-D scores below these values. The 2nd Moderator 
column indicates that a significant region exists for Time 1 CES-D scores above these values. Appendix 
B.1 includes a more comprehensive list of conditional effects at various points on the Time 1 CES-D. 
 
Rumination.  
Tests for Group Differences on Rumination. An additional part of Hypothesis 1 
was to determine if the mixed condition led to a significantly greater decrease in 
rumination than the other two conditions and if the concrete condition led to a greater 
decrease than the control. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the intervention on 
decreasing rumination, an ANCOVA was conducted on Time 2 RRS score with condition 




revealed that the assumptions of ANCOVA were tenable, and there were no violations of 
normality, linearity, homogeneity of variances, homogeneity of regression slopes, and 
reliable measurement of the covariate. The overall ANCOVA for Time 2 RRS score was 
not significant (F(2, 237) = .73, p = .48, partial eta squared = .01). A second ANCOVA 
conducted on Time 3 RRS score with Time 1 RRS as a covariate and condition as an 
independent variable also was not significant (F(2, 244) = 1.67, p = .19, partial eta 
squared = .01). Furthermore, none of the planned comparisons were significant at either 
time point (all p values > .10). However, the contrast between the mixed condition and 
the control condition on Time 3 RRS approached significance (p = .08) 
Exploratory Analysis of Condition by CES-D Interaction for Rumination 
Outcomes. Based on the interaction between initial CES-D score and condition for the 
depression outcomes, this same interaction was examined for rumination variables. CES-
D score at Time 1 was centered by subtracting the mean score. Condition was recoded 
into two dummy variables with the first dummy variable coded 1 for the concrete 
condition, and the second dummy variable coded 1 for the mixed condition. Both dummy 
variables were multiplied by the centered CES-D score to create interaction terms. As a 
first step in a sequential regression, Time 2 RRS score was regressed on Time 1 RRS 
score, CES-D score, dummy variable 1, and dummy variable 2. In the second step, the 
interaction terms were entered into the regression. The overall regression was significant 
(adjusted R2 = .60, F(6, 234)= 60.00, p < .001). The inclusion of the interaction terms led 
to a significant change in R2 (ΔR2 =.02 (F(2, 234)= 4.32, p < .05). As displayed in Table 




mixed-control contrast was significant (β = -.14, p < .02). In addition, controlling for 
Time 1 RRS score, the interaction between Time 1 CES-D and the concrete-control 
contrast was significant (β = -.17, p = .01). Variables were recoded and new interaction 
terms created to test for an interaction between Time 1 CES-D and the contrast of the 
mixed and concrete conditions. This interaction was not significant (p > .85). Figure 8 
displays a graph of the interaction. 
Table 10  
Regression Coefficients for the Prediction of Post Intervention (Time 2) RRS Scores 
Note. CES-D = Center for Epidemiological Studies- Depression Scale, RRS = Ruminative Response Scale, 
concrete-control (dummy 1) = the dummy coding for the contrast between the concrete and control 




 B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 19.11 3.22   5.93 < .001 
CES-D (Time 1) 0.59 0.11 0.47 5.20 < .001 
RRS (Time 1) 0.56 0.07 0.52 8.18 < .001 
Concrete-Control (dummy 1) -0.96 1.20 -0.04 -0.80 .43 
Mixed-Control (dummy 2) -1.82 1.24 -0.07 -1.47 .14 
CES-D x Concrete-Control -0.34 0.12 -0.17 -2.71 .01 





Figure 8. Time 1 CES-D score by RRS increase at Time 2 by condition. This figure 
shows fit lines by group for Time 1 CES-D score versus the increase in rumination from 
Time 1 to Time 2. T1 CES-D = Time 1 administration of the Center for Epidemiological 
Studies- Depression Scale, RRS change = the score on the RRS at Time 2 minus the 
score on the RRS at Time 1.  
Rumination at Time 2: Examination of the Mixed-Control by CES-D Interaction. 
The significant mixed-control contrast by Time 1 CES-D interaction was examined using 




Time 1 CES-D score, mixed-control contrast, and the interaction term. The overall 
regression was significant (R2 = .62, F(4, 154)= 64.24, p <.001). The inclusion of the 
interaction terms led to a significant change in R2 (ΔR2 =.02 (F(1, 154)= 6.01, p < .05). 
This indicates that the interaction between initial CES-D Score and the mixed-control 
contrast accounted for 2% of the variance in Time 2 RRS score. The Johnson-Neyman 
technique found one moderator value defining significance regions: 20.71. Appendix B.2 
contains a more detailed list of conditional effects for specific Time 1 CES-D scores. For 
participants with Time 1 CES-D scores above 20.71 (35.7% of the sample), controlling 
for initial rumination, the mixed condition had significantly lower levels of rumination 
than control condition at Time 2. The effect sizes ranged from .21 to .93, which indicates 
that depending on the value of the initial CES-D, the effects ranged from small to large. 
For values below 20.71, assignment to the mixed versus control conditions did not 
significantly predict subsequent RRS score at Time 2.  
Rumination at Time 2: Examination of the Concrete-Control by CES-D 
Interaction. The interaction for Time 1 CES-D with the contrast between the concrete and 
control condition was also explored. Time 2 RRS score was regressed on Time 1 RRS 
score, Time 1 CES-D score, the concrete-control contrast, and the interaction term. The 
overall regression was significant (R2 = .61, F(4, 163)= 64.06 , p <.001), and the 
inclusion of the interaction terms led to a significant change in R2 (Δ R2 =.02 (F(1, 163)= 
6.60, p = .01). This indicates that the interaction between initial CES-D score and the 
concrete-control contrast accounted for 2% of the variance in Time 2 RRS score. The 




24.79. There were 50 participants (25% of the sample) that had CES-D scores above 
24.79. For these participants, the concrete condition had significantly lower levels of 
rumination than control condition at Time 2. Cohen’s d ranged from .25 to .86 for this 
region of significance, which indicates small to large effects. For values below 24.79, the 
contrast did not affect subsequent RRS score at Time 2.  
 Rumination at Time 3. Sequential multiple regression was also used to test the 
interaction of the conditions with initial CES-D score for Time 3 rumination outcomes. 
Time 3 rumination score was regressed on Time 1 RRS score, Time 1 CES-D, dummy 1, 
and dummy 2. In the second step, the interaction terms were entered into the regression. 
The overall regression was significant (adjusted R2 = .52, F(6, 241)= 46.31, p <.001), and 
the inclusion of the interaction terms led to a significant change in R 2 (ΔR2 =.01 (F(2, 
241)= 3.43, p < .05). Table 11 shows that both the interactions of Time 1 CES-D with the 
mixed-control contrast and with the concrete-control contrasts were significant (both p 
values < .05). The dummy variables were recoded to reflect the mixed versus experiential 
contrast and new interaction terms were created. The interaction for the mixed-







Regression Coefficients for the Prediction of 2-Week Follow-Up (Time 3) RRS Scores 
Note. CES-D = Center for Epidemiological Studies- Depression Scale, RRS = Ruminative Response Scale, 
concrete-control (dummy 1) = the dummy coding for the contrast between the concrete and control 
conditions, mixed-control (dummy 2) = the dummy coding for the contrast between the mixed and control 
conditions.  
 
 B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 23.51 3.31   7.09 < .001 
CES-D (Time 1) 0.64 0.12 0.53 5.43 < .001 
RRS (Time 1) 0.43 0.07 0.41 6.07 < .001 
Concrete-Control (dummy 1) -1.02 1.26 -0.04 -0.81 .42 
Mixed-Control (dummy 2) -2.73 1.32 -0.10 -2.06 .04 
CES-D x Concrete-Control -0.29 0.13 -0.15 -2.23 .03 





Figure 9. Time 1 CES-D score by RRS increase at Time 3 by condition. This figure 
shows fit lines by group for Time 1 CES-D score versus the increase in rumination from 
Time 1 to Time 3. T1 CES-D = Time 1 administration of the Center for Epidemiological 
Studies- Depression Scale, RRS change = the score on the RRS at Time 3 minus the 
score on the RRS at Time 1.  
Rumination at Time 3: Examination of the Mixed-Control by CES-D Interaction. 
Time 3 RRS score was regressed on Time 1 RRS score, Time 1 CES-D score, the mixed-




regression was significant (R 2 = .57, F(4, 155)= 50.79 , p <.001), and the inclusion of the 
interaction terms led to a significant change in R 2 (ΔR 2 =.02, F(1, 155)= 6.01, p < .05). 
This indicates that the interaction between initial CES-D score and the mixed-control 
contrast accounted for 2% of the variance in Time 3 RRS score. The Johnson-Neyman 
technique returned one moderator value defining significance regions: 18.01. For 
participants with Time 1 CES-D scores above 18.01 (48.8% of the sample), the mixed 
condition had significantly lower levels of rumination than control condition at Time 3. 
Cohen’s d ranged from .21 to 1.0, which indicates small to large effects depending on the 
initial level of depression. For values below 18.01, the condition to which a participant 
was assigned did not affect subsequent RRS score at Time 3.  
Rumination at Time 3: Examination of the Concrete-Control by CES-D 
Interaction. Time 3 RRS score was regressed on Time 1 RRS score, Time 1 CES-D 
score, the concrete-control condition, and the interaction term. The overall regression was 
significant (R2 = .56, F(4, 170)= 54.01 , p <.001), and the inclusion of the interaction 
terms led to a significant change in R2 (ΔR2 =.01 (F(1, 170)= 4.72,  p < .05). This 
indicates that the interaction between initial CES-D score and the concrete-control 
contrast accounted for 1% of the variance in Time 3 RRS score. The Johnson-Neyman 
technique found one moderator value defining significance regions: 26.97. For 
participants with Time 1 CES-D scores above 26.97 (23% of the sample), the concrete 
condition had significantly lower levels of rumination than control condition at Time 3. 




small to large depending on the initial level of depression. For values below 26.97, the 
contrast did not affect subsequent RRS score at Time 3.  
Moderator Values Compared with Commonly Used Cut Points. Table 12 
summarizes the moderator values and results. As with the CES-D, moderator values 
seemed to indicate different results for individuals with high and low initial levels of 
depression. Results suggest that for higher initial levels of depression, the mixed and 
concrete conditions had lower levels of rumination compared to the control condition at 
Time 2 and Time 3.  
Table 12 
Summary of Moderator Values 





Mixed-Control Time 2 RRS 20.71 Mixed <  Control 
Concrete-Control Time 2 RRS 24.79 Concrete < Control   
Mixed-Concrete Time 2 RRS N.S. None 
Mixed-Control Time 3 RRS 18.01 Mixed <  Control 
Concrete-Control Time 3 RRS 26.97 Concrete < Control 
Mixed-Concrete Time 3 RRS N.S. None 
Note. This table only displays a summary of the moderator values. Appendix B.2 includes a more 
comprehensive list of conditional effects at various points on the Time 1 CES-D. N.S. = non-significant 
findings. 
 
Overgeneral Autobiographical Memory  
AMT specificity score remained relatively stable from Time 1 to Time 3. Two 




Time 2 and one on AMT score at Time 3. The ANCOVA with AMT score at Time 2 as a 
dependent variable had a significant result on Levene’s test, which tests the null 
hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
Although this significant finding is a violation of an ANCOVA assumption, the alpha 
level is considered reasonably accurate if the group sizes are roughly equal (largest/ 
smallest < 1.5, Stevens, 2009, p. 218). In this case, the largest group had 85 participants 
and the smallest group had 72, making the groups relatively equal. All other assumptions 
were met. Thus, ANCOVA is an appropriate statistical measure. Results indicated that 
neither the Time 2 AMT score (F(2, 233) = 1.03, p = .36, partial eta squared = .01) nor 
Time 3 AMT score (F(2, 240) = 1.04, p = .36 partial eta squared = .01) differed based on 
group membership. None of the planned comparisons were significant at either time 
point. Thus, Hypothesis 1 was not supported for OGM outcomes. 
Summary of Results for Hypothesis 1 
The proposed contrasts were only significant in the hypothesized direction for 
participants with high initial levels of depression symptoms. For this group, the mixed 
condition demonstrated lower levels of depression and rumination than the control 
condition post-intervention and at follow-up. Similarly, the concrete condition had 
significantly lower rumination than the control at Time 2 and Time 3 for participants with 
higher initial depression. However, the concrete- control contrast was only significant in 
the proposed direction for depression outcomes at Time 3, and only for participants with 
extremely high initial depression scores. For individuals with lower Time 1 depression, 




Time 2. This was not the case at Time 3 for the mixed-control contrast. Appendix B.1 
and Appendix B.2 display the depression and rumination results from the Johnson-
Neyman analyses for all the significant contrasts. Based on these findings, Hypothesis 1 
was partially supported. 
Hypothesis 2: The Mediation by Valued-living, Meaning, and Self-Judgment  
It was hypothesized that valued-living, personal meaning, and self-judgment 
would each partially mediate the effects of contrasts between the mixed and the concrete 
and the mixed and the control conditions on rumination. 
Results for Hypothesis 2  
Correlations between rumination and mediator variables are presented in Table 
13. According to the guidelines outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986), the first step in the 
mediation analysis would be to establish treatment differences for RRS score. Based on 
analysis from Hypothesis 1, there is no relationship between the condition to which a 
participant was assigned and rumination at Time 2 or Time 3 for the whole group. Thus, 
the mediation analysis would be unsuccessful with any of the proposed mediators for the 
sample as a whole. Depending on initial CES-D, regions of significance score were found 
for mixed-control treatment effects on RRS score. Consequently, a moderated mediation 






Means, Standard Deviations, and Inter-correlations of Rumination and Proposed 
Mediator Variables for the Whole Group 
Study 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. RRS 
Time 1 
- .75** -.16* -.26** .41** .68** -.17** -.24** .38** 
2. RRS 
Time 2 
 - -.18** -.29** .47** .80** -.23** -.22** .41** 
3. MMS 
Time 2 
  - .28** -.01 -.16* .65** .23** .08 
4. VLQ 
Time 2 
   - -.13* -.29** .33** .69** -.06 
5. KIMS 
Time 2 
    - .47** -.01 -.04 .65** 
6. RRS 
Time 3 
     - -.22** -.19** .50** 
7. MMS 
Time 3 
      - .39** .07 
8. VLQ 
Time 3 
       - -.02 
9. KIMS 
Time 3 
        - 
n 252 241 241 241 241 248 248 248 248 
M 45.04 43.42 29.51 55.52 27.13 41.66 29.46 55.95 26.30 
SD 11.46 12.26 4.64 16.50 7.25 12.04 4.21 16.98 7.13 
Note. MMS = Meaning Making Scale, RRS = Ruminative Response Scale, VLQ = Valued Living 




Moderated mediation analysis was conducted for the mixed-control treatment 
differences with each mediator included in turn and Time 1 CES-D score as a moderator. 
Figure 10 and Figure 11 display the basic structure for the moderated mediation that was 






Figure 10. Moderated mediation analysis for Time 2 RRS outcomes. RRS = Ruminative 
Response Scale. The mixed-control contrast effects on Time 2 RRS will be examined in 
three separate analyses, one for each mediator (MMS, the VLQ, and the KIMS).  
indicates the proposed moderation.  indicates the proposed mediation. 
 
 
Figure 11. Moderated mediation analysis for Time 3 RRS outcomes. RRS = Ruminative 
Response Scale. The mixed-control contrast effects on Time 3 RRS will be examined in 
three separate analyses, one for each mediator (MMS, the VLQ, and the KIMS).  
indicates the proposed moderation.  indicates the proposed mediation. 
Moderated mediation analysis provides tests of conditional indirect effects at specific 
levels of a moderator (Hayes, 2012). For example, the moderated mediation analysis 































differences on Time 2 RRS through the mediator (e.g., the MMS) depending on specific 
Time 1 CES-D scores. The analysis in Figure 10 also controlled for Time 1 RRS score. 
Hay’s Process SPSS macro was used to conduct the moderated mediation analysis. The 
output from the Process macro provides the results of two regression analyses and the 
conditional direct and indirect effects of the predictor on the outcome variable for various 
points on the mediator. In the first regression analysis the mediator (e.g., Time 2 MMS) is 
regressed on the predictor (e.g., mixed-control contrast), an interaction term (e.g., mixed-
control contrast x Time 1 CES-D), the moderator (e.g., Time 1 CES-D), and any 
variables controlled for (e.g., Time 1 RRS). The output also includes the results of a 
second regression of the outcome (e.g., Time 2 RRS) on the mediator, the predictor, the 
interaction term, the moderator, and any variable controlled for.  
One of the challenges of this type of analysis is that the direct and indirect effects 
are conditional upon Time 1 CES-D score. Hayes (2012) recommends probing the effects 
at points corresponding to particular scores on the moderator. The Process SPSS macro 
automatically tests effects at points corresponding to the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th 
percentiles on the moderator. Bootstrapping is used to calculate 95% confidence intervals 
for the indirect treatment effects on the outcome at these select points. Bootstrapping is a 
process by which smaller samples are repeatedly taken from a larger sample to calculate 
empirical estimates of standard errors and confidence intervals (Keith, 2006). This study 
used 1000 samples to estimate the confidence intervals. In cases where the confidence 
interval does not contain the value of zero in its range, a significant effect has occurred 




mediation to occur in the model we are using, the interaction of the predictor and 
moderator must be significant on either the mediator or the outcome, and there must be 
significant indirect effects from the predictor to the outcome variable (Hayes, 2012).The 
moderated mediation analysis was conducted at both Time 2 and Time 3. 
Results of the moderated mediation analyses. As part of the moderated mediation, 
each of the MMS, VLQ, and KIMS were separately regressed on Time 1 RRS, Time 1 
CES-D, the interaction term, and the mixed-control contrast. The interaction term was not 
a significant predictor for any of the mediators at either Time 2 or Time 3 (all p values 
>.05). As in Hypothesis 1, the interaction of Time 1 CES-D and the mixed-control 
contrast was a significant predictor of both Time 2 RRS and Time 3 RRS controlling for 
Time 1 RRS and the mediators (all p values < .05). However, there were no significant 
indirect effects at any of the selected Time 1 CES-D scores tested. Appendix B.3 contains 
the conditional indirect and direct effects for different values of Time 1 CES-D. As there 
were not interactions between the mixed-concrete contrast and Time 1 CES-D on any of 
the mediators, additional models were run, which were identical to the ones in Figures 10 
and 11 except that the interactions on mediators were omitted. The interaction between 
the mixed-concrete contrast and Time 1 CES-D on rumination was retained in these 
models. Once again, there were no significant indirect effects through the mediators (all p 





Summary of Results for Hypothesis 2 
Based on these findings, there is no evidence that the MMS, VLQ, or the KIMS 
mediated the treatment differences on rumination at either Time 2 or Time 3. As such, 
Hypothesis 2 was not supported.  
Hypothesis 3: Rumination Mediates the Effects of the Intervention on Overgeneral 
Autobiographical Memory 
It was hypothesized that rumination would mediate the effects of the treatments on 
autobiographical overgeneral memory specificity assessed at post-intervention (Time 2) 
and at follow up (Time 3). Specifically, it was predicted that participants in the mixed 
and concrete treatment conditions would display a reduction in rumination, which in turn 
would be associated with a decrease in overgeneral autobiographical memory. 
Results for Hypothesis 3 
 The first requirement for a mediation to have occurred is for there to be a 
significant treatment difference for AMT score. As demonstrated in the analysis for 
Hypothesis 1, condition did not differ on AMT score at Time 2 or Time 3, and thus, a 
mediation is not possible. Therefore, there is no evidence to support Hypothesis 3. 
Hypothesis 4: Rumination Mediates the Effect of the Treatment on Depressive Symptoms 
 It was predicted that rumination would partially mediate the effects of the 
treatment on depressive symptoms at Time 2 and Time 3. Specifically, participants in the 
mixed and concrete conditions were expected to display a decrease in rumination at Time 
2 and Time 3 compared to the control condition, which in turn will be associated with a 




Results for Hypothesis 4 
 As discussed in the results for Hypothesis 1, there were significant interactions 
between the conditions and Time 1 CES-D for depression and rumination outcomes. 
Therefore, moderated mediation analyses were conducted as shown in Figure 12 and 
Figure 13.  
 
 
Figure 12. Moderated mediation analysis for Time 2 CES-D outcomes. CES-D = Center 
for Epidemiological Studies- Depression Scale, RRS = Ruminative Response Scale, two 
different contrasts will be examined in separate analysis: the mixed-control contrast and 





















Figure 13. Moderated mediation analysis for Time 3 CES-D outcomes. CES-D = Center 
for Epidemiological Studies- Depression Scale, RRS = Ruminative Response Scale, two 
different contrasts will be examined in separate analysis: the mixed-control contrast and 
the concrete-control contrast.  indicates the proposed moderation.  indicates the 
proposed mediation. 
 Analytic Strategy 
As in Hypothesis 2, a moderated mediation analysis was conducted using the 
Process SPSS macro (Hayes, 2012). The moderated mediation analysis allows for the 
estimation of the indirect treatment effects on post-intervention CES-D through post-
intervention RRS, depending on specific Time 1 CES-D scores. This analysis also 
controlled for Time 1 RRS score. In order for a moderated mediation to occur, the 
interaction of the predictor and moderator on the mediator or on the outcome must be 
significant, and there must be significant indirect effects from the predictor to the 
outcome variable (Hayes, 2012). The direct and indirect effects were tested at points 
corresponding to the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles on the Time 1 CES-D. 
The macro also allowed for the testing of particular points as well. This made it possible 


















effects. Means used in the interaction terms were centered to avoid multicolinearity. The 
moderated mediation analysis was conducted at both Time 2 and Time 3 and for both the 
mixed-control and concrete-control contrasts. 
 Time 2 Mediation of Mixed-Control Treatment Differences on CES-D by RRS. 
Appendix B.4 contains the complete results for this moderated mediation analysis. Table 
14 displays the direct and indirect effects at specific percentiles of Time 1 CES-D. As 
shown in Appendix B.4, the interaction between Time 1 CES-D score and the mixed-
control contrast was a significant predictor of Time 2 RRS score (p < .05). Furthermore, 
because the 75th and 90th percentiles do not include zero in the corresponding confidence 
intervals, there are significant indirect effects at these points (See Table 14). Thus, a 
moderated mediation has occurred. Additionally, starting at a value of 24 (for Time 1 
CES-D), the indirect effects were significant and increased for higher values of 
depression. This finding is confirmed by the tests at the previously found cut point 
(28.52) and at the 90th percentile. Although the indirect effects were significant, the direct 
effects were not. This indicates that a full mediation occurred for scores above 24 on the 
Time 1 CES-D. These findings suggest that for individuals with higher levels of 
depression (approximate CES-D score > 24), the treatment differences for the mixed-
control contrast on Time 2 CES-D were explained by the treatment effects of the contrast 






Conditional Effects of Mixed-Control Contrast on Time 2 CES-D from the Mediation 
Moderation Analysis 














10 8.00 4.29 1.25 3.44 < .01 0.92 0.86 -0.66 2.72 
25 11.00 3.64 1.06 3.42 < .01 0.35 0.72 -1.05 1.86 
50 17.00 2.35 0.84 2.80 .01 -0.78 0.66 -2.20 0.45 
75 24.00 0.85 0.96 0.88 .38 -2.09 0.99 -4.24 -0.32 
 28.52 -0.13 1.21 -0.11 .92 -2.95 1.38 -5.59 -0.15 
90 32.00 -0.88 1.45 -0.60 .55 -3.60 1.56 -7.12 -0.97 
Note. T1 CES-D = Score on the Time 1 administration of the Center for Epidemiological Studies- 
Depression Scale, Boot SE = the standard error that resulted from the bootstrap analysis, BootLLCI = the 
bootstrapped lower limit of the 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect at the conditional point 
listed, BootULCI = the bootstrapped upper limit of the 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect at the 
conditional point listed. The bolded row indicates that the Time 1 CES-D value tested was a moderator 
value from the Hypothesis 1 analysis. 
 
Time 2 Mediation of Concrete-Control Treatment Effects on CES-D by RRS. Appendix 
B.5 contains the complete results for this moderated mediation analysis. Table 15 
displays the direct and indirect effects at specific percentiles of Time 1 CES-D. As shown 
in Appendix B.5, the interaction between Time 1 CES-D score and the concrete-control 
contrast was a significant predictor of Time 2 RRS score (p < .05). However, as all the 
confidence intervals contain zero, there are no significant indirect effects at this point 
(See Table 15). Therefore, a mediation has not occurred at this point. This result is 
consistent with previous findings. The only significant region for the concrete-control 
contrast on Time 2 CES-D was below a Time 1 CES-D score of 15.44. The region of 
significance for the concrete-control contrast on Time 2 RRS was above a Time 1 CES-D 




predictor of depression and rumination for the same values of Time 1 CES-D. As such, a 
mediation could not occur.  
Table 15 
Conditional Effects of Concrete-Control Contrast on Time 2 CES-D from the Mediation 
Moderation Analysis 














10 7.00 2.63 1.23 2.15 .03 1.70 0.93 -0.10 3.54 
25 11.00 2.41 1.00 2.42 .02 0.92 0.74 -0.57 2.36 
50 17.00 2.07 0.81 2.57 .01 -0.25 0.72 -1.64 1.26 
75 24.00 1.69 0.95 1.78 .08 -1.61 1.08 -3.80 0.59 
90 32.00 1.24 1.43 0.87 .39 -3.17 1.69 -6.68 0.02 
Note. T1 CES-D = Score on the Time 1 administration of the Center for Epidemiological Studies- 
Depression Scale, Boot SE = the standard error that resulted from the bootstrap analysis, BootLLCI = the 
bootstrapped lower limit of the 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect at the conditional point 
listed, BootULCI = the bootstrapped upper limit of the 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect at the 
conditional point listed. 
 
Time 3 Mediation by RRS of the Mixed-Control Treatment Effects on CES-D. Appendix 
B.6 contains the complete results for this moderated mediation analysis. Table 16 
displays the direct and indirect effects at specific percentiles of Time 1 CES-D. As shown 
in Appendix B.6, the interaction between Time 1 CES-D score and the mixed-control 
contrast was a significant predictor of Time 3 RRS score (p < .05), while controlling for 
initial RRS score. Furthermore, because the previously found cut point (23.91) does not 
include zero, there are significant indirect effects at this point (See Table 16). Thus, a 
moderated mediation has occurred. Indirect effects increased for higher values of CES-D. 
Additional tests at the 75th and 90th percentiles confirmed the increase in indirect effects. 




not. This indicates that a full mediation occurred above this value. These findings suggest 
that for individuals with higher levels of depression (approximate CES-D score > 24), the 
treatment differences for the mixed-control contrast on Time 3 CES-D were explained by 
the treatment effects of the contrast on Time 3 RRS, while controlling for initial level of 
rumination.  
Table 16 
Conditional Effects of Mixed-Control Contrast on Time 3 CES-D from the Mediation 
Moderation Analysis 














10 8.00 2.04 1.25 1.63 .10 0.48 1.01 -1.30 2.76 
25 11.00 1.66 1.07 1.55 .12 -0.14 0.85 -1.70 1.85 
50 17.00 0.90 0.85 1.06 .29 -1.39 0.76 -2.92 0.18 
 
23.11 0.13 0.94 0.14 .89 -2.66 1.05 -4.71 -0.53 
75 24.00 0.01 0.98 0.02 .99 -2.84 1.07 -5.02 -0.83 
90 32.00 -1.00 1.47 -0.68 .50 -4.50 1.66 -7.70 -1.44 
Note. T1 CES-D = Score on the Time 1 administration of the Center for Epidemiological Studies- 
Depression Scale, Boot SE = the standard error that resulted from the bootstrap analysis, BootLLCI = the 
bootstrapped lower limit of the 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect at the conditional point 
listed, BootULCI = the bootstrapped upper limit of the 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect at the 
conditional point listed. The bolded row indicates that the Time 1 CES-D value tested was a moderator 
value from the Hypothesis 1 analysis. 
 
Time 3 Mediation of the Concrete-Control Treatment Effects on CES-D by RRS. 
Appendix B.7 contains the complete results for this moderated mediation analysis. Table 
17 displays the direct and indirect effects at specific percentiles of Time 1 CES-D. As 
shown in Appendix B.7, the interaction between Time 1 CES-D score and the concrete-
control contrast was a significant predictor of Time 3 RRS score (p < .05) controlling for 




of 43.06 does not include zero, there is a significant indirect effect at this point (See 
Table 17) and a moderated mediation has occurred. As only five participants in the 
sample had Time 1 CES-D scores above 43, these findings must be interpreted 
cautiously. These findings may suggest that for individuals with very high levels of 
depression (approximate CES-D score > 43), the treatment differences for the concrete-
control contrast on Time 3 CESD were explained by the treatment effects of the contrast 
on Time 3 RRS, while controlling for initial level of rumination.  
Table 17 
Conditional Effects of Concrete-Control Contrast on Time 3 CES-D from the Mediation 
Moderation Analysis 














10 7 2.84 1.33 2.13 .03 1.49 1.18 -0.72 4.01 
25 11 2.41 1.09 2.22 .03 0.75 0.96 -0.99 2.82 
50 16 1.88 0.90 2.09 .04 -0.19 0.84 -1.78 1.46 
75 24 1.03 1.03 1.00 .32 -1.68 1.07 -3.68 0.46 
90 32 0.18 1.53 0.11 .91 -3.18 1.61 -6.25 < .01 
 
43.06 -1.00 2.42 -0.41 .68 -5.25 2.55 -10.59 -0.63 
Note. T1 CES-D = Score on the Time 1 administration of the Center for Epidemiological Studies- 
Depression Scale, Boot SE = the standard error that resulted from the bootstrap analysis, BootLLCI = the 
bootstrapped lower limit of the 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect at the conditional point 
listed, BootULCI = the bootstrapped upper limit of the 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect at the 
conditional point listed. The bolded row indicates that the Time 1 CES-D value tested was a moderator 
value from the Hypothesis 1 analysis. 
 
Summary of Hypothesis 4 Results 
The results suggest that, generally, for participants with higher initial levels of 
depression, the significant treatment effects found for depression are fully mediated by 




Johnson-Neyman moderator values found in Hypothesis 1 were inputted into the 
moderated mediation analysis, the two analyses are not parallel; the moderated mediation 
analysis controlled for Time 1 RRS and the mediator, whereas the Johnson-Neyman 
analysis for depression outcomes did not. This explains how there were indirect effects 
below the previously found region of significance for the mixed-control analysis on Time 
2 depression. Still, the results indicate that controlling for Time 1 RRS, a full mediation 
occurred for the mixed-control contrasts on depression at both Time 2 and Time 3 for all 
Time 1 CES-D values higher than 24. For low values of initial depression, rumination 
outcomes did not have any regions of significance. Hence, a mediation of the treatment 
effects on depression outcomes could not occur at those points. As such, Hypothesis 4 





CHAPTER 5  
Discussion 
Were the Interventions Effective in Reducing Distress?  
The first hypothesis predicted that combining concrete and abstract processing 
when thinking about negative experiences would reduce distress. Specifically, 
Hypothesis 1a proposed that participants adopting this mixed abstract and concrete 
perspective would have lower levels of rumination, depression, and overgeneral 
autobiographical memory compared to participants in the traditional concrete condition 
and the control condition. Hypothesis 1b proposed that the traditional concrete condition 
would also have advantages when compared to the control condition.  
The study provided preliminary evidence that adopting a mixed perspective can 
be effective in decreasing distress; both the mixed condition and the concrete condition 
displayed some advantages over the control condition for people with higher initial levels 
of depression. These benefits were observed for rumination and depression symptoms but 
not for overgeneral autobiographical memory. It is important to note that benefits 
depended on initial levels of depression, with both the mixed and concrete conditions 
only demonstrating advantages for higher pre-intervention levels of depression. Although 
both the mixed and concrete groups performed significantly better than the control in 
reducing rumination for this group, only the mixed condition led to better depression 
outcomes than the control for a substantial number of participants with higher pre-




The conditional benefits of the mixed perspective might be due to differences in 
the abilities of depressed and non-depressed participants to traverse the goal hierarchy. It 
was proposed that the mixed condition would reduce rumination by moving participants 
through the abstract and concrete levels of the hierarchy, thereby creating more 
connections and more organized action. Two recent studies suggest that, when confronted 
with sad content and negative emotions, depressed individuals maintain thought at the 
abstract level, whereas non-depressed individuals tend to shift thinking toward the 
concrete level (Takano & Tanno, 2009; Watkins, Moberly, & Moulds, 2011). This could 
indicate that non-depressed individuals automatically traverse the hierarchy, whereas 
depressed individuals become stuck at the abstract level (Watkins, Moberly, & Moulds, 
2011). If this is the case, the conditions might not have differed for participants with low 
pre-intervention depression because they already dealt with the negative experiences by 
moving between the abstract and concrete levels. In contrast, treatment effects could exist 
for more depressed participants, who needed the encouragement of the mixed condition 
to traverse the hierarchy. 
Although differences between the mixed and the concrete conditions at higher 
levels of initial depression were in the expected direction, these differences were not 
statistically significant: Neither first order effects or interactions with initial depression 
were found. The fact that the mixed condition did not produce significantly better 
outcomes than the concrete condition is disappointing in that results do not suggest that 
the addition of abstract, values-directed thinking improved upon the concrete condition. 




condition did not have adverse effects compared to the concrete condition. Several 
researchers have found that abstract thought about negative content leads to more 
rumination and depression than concrete thought (Moberly & Watkins, 2006; Raes, 
Watkins, Williams, & Hermans, 2008; Rimes & Watkins, 2005; Watkins, 2004; Watkins, 
Moberly, & Moulds, 2008; Watkins & Moulds, 2005; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004). 
In contrast to these findings, the results indicate that abstract thought, albeit in 
combination with concrete thought, did not increase rumination and depression compared 
to the concrete condition. In fact, the mixed condition had a greater long-term reduction 
in rumination on average compared to the concrete condition (though not significantly 
greater). Therefore, the findings are more in line with researchers who argue that abstract 
thought is not always detrimental (Kross & Ayduk, 2005; Rude et al., 2011).  
A harder question to answer is whether the mixed condition was only beneficial 
because it included a concrete component. Because the mixed-concrete contrast was not 
significant at any point, there can be no definitive answer as to whether one condition 
was more beneficial. Consistent with previous studies that found that concrete 
interventions are beneficial for individuals with dysphoria, the concrete condition 
demonstrated reductions in rumination compared to the control for individuals with 
higher pre-intervention depression. (Watkins, Baeyens, & Read, 2009; Watkins & 
Moberly, 2009). However, the concrete condition did not have benefits for depression at 
post-intervention, and at the two week follow-up, only differed from the control condition 
for a handful of extremely depressed participants (less than 2% of the sample was in this 




condition had significant reductions in depression for a large portion of participants with 
high pre-intervention depression (28% of the sample fell above the cut point at Time 3). 
Hence, there could be some unique benefit to the mixed condition that translates into 
these depression outcomes.   
This study was the first to encourage a mixed abstract and concrete perspective as 
a means to decrease rumination. Separate studies have found benefits to certain types of 
abstract thought and certain types of concrete thought, but no study has explicitly 
combined the beneficial aspects of the two (Kross & Ayduk, 2005; Rude et al., 2011; 
Watkins, Baeyens, & Read, 2009; Watkins & Moberly, 2009). The theoretical basis for 
the proposed advantages of the mixed condition was grounded in Control Theory. 
Control Theory contends that rumination occurs when negative experiences highlight a 
lack of progress toward important higher-level goals within a goal hierarchy (Martin & 
Tesser, 2006). Watkins argues that concrete interventions are beneficial in that they allow 
individuals to focus on concrete actions and problem solving and avoid abstract questions 
of “why.” It was proposed that the mixed condition, by including beneficial abstract 
thought and by traversing the abstract and concrete levels, would help individuals create 
more organized connections in their goal hierarchy and discover additional concrete ways 
to resume progress towards goals. However, direct comparisons did not support 
differences between the mixed and concrete conditions, and it is unclear if the inclusion 
of the exploration of values led to any advantages in the mixed condition. Although both 
mixed condition and concrete condition may have asked individuals to traverse the goal 




for the mixed condition on depression outcomes, it might be tied to the increase in 
connections between the levels.  
Unexpected Adverse Effects for Participants with Lower Pre-Intervention Depressive 
Symptoms  
An unexpected finding of the study was that non-depressed participants had 
higher post-intervention depression in the mixed condition and the concrete condition 
compared to the control. This effect was not observed at the two-week follow-up for the 
mixed-control contrast. One explanation for these findings is that repeatedly 
concentrating on negative experiences might have been outside the norm for non-
depressed participants; therefore, the interventions might have made negative content and 
emotions more salient than usual. One difference between the conditions was that the 
control condition asked participants to think about negative experiences, but 
subsequently, write about an unrelated topic. Thus, participants in the control condition 
may have been distracted from the negative experiences, whereas participants in the 
mixed and control condition may have focused more directly on the negative experiences.  
Research is varied as to the benefits of distraction. Some studies find distraction 
scales positively correlated with depression (e.g., Schmaling, Dimidjian, Katon, & 
Sullivan, 2002), whereas others find it negatively correlated (e.g., Lam, Smith, Checkley, 
Rijsdijk, & Sham, 2003). In addition, Wenzlaff and Wegner (2000) have suggested that 
the positive effects of distraction are temporary and distraction may lead to worse 
outcomes long-term. This would explain why the mixed condition was no longer 




also found that the benefits from distraction only exist for participants with active 
depression (Kuehner, Huffziger, & Liebsch, 2009; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1993, 1995; Lyubomirsky et al., 1999; Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993). Therefore, it is unclear whether the increase in depression 
was due to the more concentrated focus on negative content in the mixed and concrete 
conditions or due to beneficial aspects of distraction in the control condition.  
Importantly, the negative effects for the mixed condition were not lasting. By the 
two-week follow-up, the mixed condition no longer significantly differed from the 
control condition. This might indicate that once participants were no longer asked to 
repeatedly focus on negative experiences, their mood improved. This fits with the 
hypothesis that a repeated sad mood induction might account for the higher levels of 
post-intervention depression. Interestingly, the concrete condition still differed from the 
control condition at the follow-up for a large proportion of participants with low pre-
intervention depression. As the concrete condition asked participants to go into more 
detail about their experiences than the mixed condition, it could be that the mood 
response was stronger in the concrete condition, and thus, the effects more lasting.  
Overgeneral Autobiographical Memory  
The results failed to support the hypothesis that the mixed and concrete conditions 
would decrease overgeneral autobiographical memory compared to the control. This is 
surprising as several studies found benefits to concrete thought in reducing overgeneral 
autobiographical memory (Raes, Watkins, Williams, & Hermans, 2009; Watkins & 




with rumination or depression at any single measurement point. This is inconsistent with 
most previous studies that suggest rumination is a key component of overgeneral 
autobiographical memory and that overgeneral autobiographical memory predicts the 
severity and likelihood of future depression (Hermans et al., 2008; Gibbs & Rude, 2004; 
Sumner, Griffith, & Mineka, 2010; Sumner et al., 2011; Williams, 2007). However, there 
have also been several studies that have failed to demonstrate that OGM concurrently or 
prospectively predicts depressed populations (Brewin, Reynolds, & Tata, 1999; 
Dalgleish, Spinks, Yiend, & Kuyken, 2001; Iqbal, Birchwood, Hemsley, Jackson, & 
Morris, 2004; Kaney, Bowen-Jones, & Bentall, 1999). As there were no treatment effects, 
the proposed hypothesis that treatment differences in overgeneral autobiographical 
memory would be mediated by changes in rumination was not supported.  
Some researchers recently suggested that the Autobiographical Memory Task 
may not have the desired sensitivity in non-clinical samples (Raes, Hermen, Williams, & 
Eelen, 2007). In examining previous studies with non-clinical participants, they suggest 
ratios of overgeneral memories to total memories of .21 - .46 were too low to be 
clinically predictive. The ratio of baseline overgeneral memories to total memories in the 
present sample was .17 ((12-9.94)/12), which is an even lower ratio. Therefore, it is 
possible that for the present sample, the AMT was not sensitive enough to be an effective 
measure. These same authors suggest that providing participants with less specific 
instructions might increase the sensitivity in college populations (Raes, Hermen, 
Williams, & Eelen, 2007). They have created an instrument called the SCEPT, which 




Memory Task in this study were presented both in written and video format, it could be 
that the instructions were too thorough for this population and decreased sensitivity. If 
this is the case, it would explain the lack of treatment differences and the lack of 
correlation with rumination and depression.  
Did Changes in Rumination Explain Depression Outcomes?  
The results suggest that, for most individuals with high initial levels of 
depression, changes in rumination generally explained changes in depression. The 
analysis examined if, depending on pre-intervention depression level and accounting for 
pre-intervention rumination, treatment differences on post-intervention depression scores 
were mediated by post-intervention rumination. The findings indicate that, for 
participants with higher initial depression, the reductions in depression were fully 
mediated by the reductions in rumination, such that the mixed condition led to reductions 
in depression through reducing rumination. Rumination has been shown to predict the 
likelihood and severity of depression (McIntosh & Martin, 1992; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; 
Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001). Furthermore, several studies demonstrate that rumination 
often mediates the effects of other predictors of depression (Lo, Ho, & Hollon, 2008; 
McLaughlin & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2011; Szasz, 2009). Thus, the findings for individuals 
with high initial levels of depression are consistent with previous literature. Interestingly, 
the changes in depression for individuals with low levels of initial rumination were not 
explained by changes in rumination. This could indicate that some other factor besides 
changes in rumination accounted for the higher levels of depression at post-intervention 




Through What Mechanisms Did the Mixed Condition Reduce Rumination Levels?  
 The hypothesis that changes in meaning making, self-judgment, and valued living 
would partially mediate the changes in rumination was not supported. Overall, the mixed 
condition did not differ from the concrete or control condition in post-intervention 
rumination, and thus, mediation was not supported for the sample as a whole. For 
individuals with higher pre-intervention depression, the mixed condition did have 
significantly lower rumination than the control. Therefore, several mediators were 
explored using a moderated mediation analysis.  
The results were not significant for any of the proposed mediations. This is 
surprising as several authors have suggested that the creation of meaning and fostering a 
non-judgment perspective are advantages of certain types of abstract thought (Kross & 
Ayduk, 2011; Rude et al., 2011). Furthermore, the Valued Living Questionnaire was 
selected as a way to measure the degree to which participants’ higher-level values were 
connected to their actions. As the mixed condition directly asked participants to explore 
their values, it is also surprising that this measure did not partially explain changes in 
rumination. Based on the findings, it is unclear if the mixed condition reduced rumination 
through any of these mechanisms.  
Strengths of Study 
There are a number of strengths for the present study. First, the study employed a 
large sample size. This lent sufficient experimental power for the statistical tests. In 
addition, because prescreening questions were included, the sample may have had higher 




Another strength of the study is that the interventions asked participants to think 
about “real life” experiences that were bothering them. This allowed participants to be 
more invested in the study than if hypothetical situations were used. Moreover, the use of 
personal experiences allowed the results to be more generalizable to a therapeutic setting.  
 The study also utilized a randomized control design. This type of design is one of 
the most rigorous for between group comparisons and allows for inferences to be made 
about treatment differences while controlling for many confounding factors. Because 
both a control and a concrete condition were included, inferences could be made about 
whether improvements in the mixed condition could be related to existing interventions. 
Furthermore, taking outcome measurements at multiple time points allowed for an 
examination of the stability of the findings. 
Limitations 
 A main limitation is that the sample used in this study makes generalizing results 
more difficult. The study was comprised entirely of college students with a mean age of 
approximately 21. It is uncertain how the results will generalize to older and younger 
populations. The racial/ethnic makeup of the sample also limits generalizability as many 
different groups were underrepresented. For example, no African-American participants 
were randomly assigned to the mixed condition. In addition, college populations are 
unique in socioeconomic status and education compared to other populations. As such, 
the types of bothersome negative experiences that participants wrote about in this study 
might not be typical for other populations. For instance, 21% of the sample’s bothersome 




experiences concerning parenting. It is uncertain how writing about different types of 
events might affect rumination and depression outcomes.  
 A second limitation that arose from the sample is that the number of participants 
with very high levels of depression was fewer than desired. For example, a CES-D 
moderator value of 43 was found for concrete-control treatment differences on Time 3 
depression score. Only 5 participants in this sample fell above this point, which makes 
the findings very susceptible to extreme values and difficult to generalize.  
 Another limitation is that encouraging different levels of processing may not be 
effective for all types of negative experience. This study asked participants to examine 
negative experiences with the hope that, by learning to process them in a new way, they 
could avoid rumination. However, it is unclear whether processing events in a different 
way would be an effective tool against systematic bias or the societal barriers that 
someone might face. One of the proposed advantages of the mixed condition was that it 
would help participants discover alternative ways to move toward higher level goals. In 
cases involving systematic oppression, where there are no alternative actions, it is unclear 
if the condition would have the desired effect.  
 The study is also limited in that the majority of constructs in this study were 
operationalized using self-reported measures. Self-report measures are subject to the 
participants’ biases, accuracy, and honesty. Because participants in this sample were 
assigned to the study in return for course credit, the accuracy of their responses is a 
particular concern and their investment in the study may be low. An attempt was made to 




participants’ self-reported honesty and accuracy. Self-report measures may also be 
subject to demand characteristics. This problem is somewhat mitigated for the condition 
comparisons by the use of a randomized control. However, these issues may be more 
problematic when drawing conclusions about the within factor (i.e., changes over time).  
An additional limitation may be the conditions selected for inclusion in the study. 
The control condition did not write as much about their negative experiences as did the 
concrete and mixed condition. In designing the control condition it was difficult to strike 
a balance between having participants think about a negative experience, but write about 
it in a way that did not change the level of processing and did not encourage rumination. 
Therefore, the current control condition had participants write about their daily activities. 
It could be argued that this served as a distraction intervention, which may have added a 
confounding factor. Furthermore, whereas participants in the control condition thought 
about their experiences and wrote briefly about them, the majority of the writing in the 
control condition was about an unrelated topic (e.g., what they did on a typical Monday). 
Cognitive processing theory suggests that writing about negative experiences helps 
individuals process emotions and assimilate experiences into their cognitive framework 
(Jones & Pennebaker, 2006; Pennebaker, 1997). Several studies have found that 
expressive writing is useful in reducing rumination, negative affect, and depressive 
symptoms (Baikie, Geerligs, & Wilhelm, 2012; Gortner, Rude, & Pennebaker, 2006; 
Langens & Schüler, 2005; Lepore, 1997; Soliday, Garofalo, & Rogers, 2004). Therefore, 
it is important to acknowledge that the mixed and concrete conditions could have had 




Conclusions and Future directions 
 In conclusion, this study suggests that initial depressive symptoms may be 
important when selecting treatments targeting rumination and depression. Interventions 
that combine abstract and concrete thought appear beneficial in reducing rumination and 
depression for populations with high levels of depressive symptoms. Furthermore, the 
effects appear to be stable over time, with treatment differences remaining at the two-
week follow-up. As the concrete condition led to significant improvements in rumination 
for individuals with high pre-intervention depression compared to the control but not 
improvements in depression, encouraging mixed perspectives could offer advantages 
over traditional concrete perspectives for depression outcomes. Still, in the present study, 
direct comparisons did not support differences between the mixed and concrete 
conditions. More research is needed with larger clinical samples to clarify whether mixed 
perspectives offer benefits over concrete perspectives for reducing distress. In contrast to 
the theory that abstract processing about negative content is detrimental, the inclusion of 
abstract processing did not increase rumination.  
 Although these findings are preliminary, there is an implication that individuals’ 
current level of depression may influence how well they respond to mixed and concrete 
interventions. For people without clinical levels of depression, encouraging a repeated 
focus on bothersome negative experiences from a concrete perspective might worsen 
long-term depression outcomes. This is also true of focusing on negative experiences 




evidence that, for people with active depression, treatments that encourage a mixed 








1. What is your sex? 
__ Male     __ Female 
2. What is your age? 
___ 




___ Native American  
___ White  
___ Middle  Eastern 
___ Bi or Multi-Racial 
___ Other: 










Center for Epidemiologic Studies—Depression Scale 
Circle the number of each statement that best describes how often you felt or behaved this 
way – DURING THE PAST WEEK. 
 Rarely or 
none of the 
time (less 
than 1 day) 
Some or a 




or a moderate 
amount of the 
time (3-4 days) 
Most or all 
of the time 
(5-7 days) 
During the past week: 0 1 2 3 
1) I was bothered by things 
that usually don’t bother me 
0 1 2 3 
2) I did not feel like eating; 
my appetite was poor 
0 1 2 3 
3) I felt that I could not shake 
off the blues even with help 
from my family and friends 
0 1 2 3 
4) I felt that I was just as 
good as other people 
0 1 2 3 
5) I had trouble keeping my 
mind on what I was doing 




6) I felt depressed 0 1 2 3 
7) I felt that everything I did 
was an effort 
0 1 2 3 
8) I felt hopeful about the 
future 
0 1 2 3 
9) I thought my life had been 
a failure 
0 1 2 3 
10) I felt fearful 0 1 2 3 
11) My sleep was restless 0 1 2 3 
12) I was happy 0 1 2 3 
13) I talked less than usual 0 1 2 3 
14) I felt lonely 0 1 2 3 
15) People were unfriendly 0 1 2 3 
16) I enjoyed life 0 1 2 3 
17) I had crying spells 0 1 2 3 
18) I felt sad 0 1 2 3 
19) I felt that people disliked 
me 
0 1 2 3 






Please read each of the items below and indicate how often, within the past 2 weeks, 
you have thought or done each one. Please indicate what you generally have done, not 










1 Think about how alone you feel  
2 Think “I won’t be able to do my job if I don’t snap out of this.”  
3 Think about your feelings of fatigue and achiness  
4 Think about how hard it is to concentrate  
5 Think “What am I doing to deserve this?”  
6 Think about how passive and unmotivated you feel  
7 Analyze recent events to try to understand why you are depressed  
8 Think about how you don’t seem to feel anything anymore  
9 Think “Why can’t I get going?”  
10 Think “Why do I always react this way?”  
11 Go away by yourself and think about why you feel this way  
12 Write down what you are thinking and analyze it  
13 Think about a recent situation, wishing it had gone better  




15 Think “Why do I have problems other people don’t have?”  
16 Think “Why can’t I handle things better?”  
17 Think about how sad you feel  
18 Think about all your shortcomings, failings, faults, mistakes  
19 Think about how you don’t feel up to doing anything  
20 Analyze your personality to try to understand why you are depressed  
21 Go someplace alone to think about your feelings  











 Below are domains of life that are valued by some people. We are concerned with 
your subjective experience of your quality of life in each of these domains. One aspect of 
quality of life involves the importance one puts on the different domains of living. Rate 
the importance of each domain (by circling a number) on a scale of 1 to 10; 1 means that 
domain is not at all important, and 10 means that domain is very important. Not everyone 
will value all of these domains, or value all domains the same. Rate each domain 






















1. Family relations (other than marriage or 
parenting) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
2. Marriage/couples/ intimate relations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
3. Parenting 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
4. Friendships/social relations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
5. Employment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
6. Education/training 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 




8. Spirituality 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
9. Citizenship/ community life 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
10. Physical well-being 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
In this section, we would like you to give a rating of how consistent your actions are with 
each value. Everyone does better in some domains than others. We are NOT asking about 
your ideal in each domain. We want to know how you think you have been doing during 
the past week. Rate each item (by circling a number) on a scale of 1 to 10; 1 means that 
your actions have been fully inconsistent with your value, and 10 means that your actions 
























1. Family relations (other than marriage or 
parenting) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
2. Marriage/couples/ intimate relations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
3. Parenting 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
4. Friendships/social relations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
5. Employment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
6. Education/training 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 




8. Spirituality 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
9. Citizenship/ community life 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 







Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills  
Please rate each of the following statements using the scale provided. Write the number 
in the blank that best describes your own opinion of what is generally true for you when 
you think about bothersome events 












Accept Without Judgment items 
I tell myself that I shouldn’t be feeling the way I’m feeling. 
I believe some of my thoughts are abnormal or bad and I shouldn’t think that way. 
I make judgments about whether my thoughts are good or bad. 
I tend to make judgments about how worthwhile or worthless my experiences are. 
I tell myself that I shouldn’t be thinking the way I’m thinking. 
I think some of my emotions are bad or inappropriate and I shouldn’t feel them. 
I disapprove of myself when I have irrational ideas. 
I criticize myself for having irrational or inappropriate emotions. 







The Meaning-Making Scale 
Please rate the following statements on how strongly you agree or disagree with them.  
Strongly 
disagree 
    Strongly 
agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
I actively take the time to reflect on events that happen in my life. 
I have an understanding of what makes my life meaningful. 
I prefer not to think about the meaning of events that I encounter (r). 
When difficult things happen, I am usually quick to see the meaning of why they happen 
to me. 
Self-reflection helps me to make my life meaningful.  
I actively focus on activities and events that I personally find valuable.  







Value Clarification Task 
 Below is a list of values and examples of what these values might mean to an 
individual. Please examine the values and check any that are important for you. 
Connection with Others  
e.g., It is important to you to have people in your life that you feel close and connected 
with. 
Family  
e.g., It is important to you to have strong bonds with family members and/or to have your 
own family. 
Spirituality  
e.g., It is important to you to have spirituality or religion in your life. 
Independence  
e.g., It is important to you to have independence of thought and activity; to have freedom 
to plan and not depend on others. 
Contribute to Others  
e.g., It is important for you to help other people 
Honor Tradition  
e.g., It is important to you to have commitment to cultural customs and ideas; to do things 
the way you learned from your family. 
Security  
e.g., It is important to you to live in secure surroundings; to have a secure income and 
know how your needs will be met. 
Power  
e.g., It is important to you to be in charge and have authority, respect, or resources. 
Achievement  
e.g., It is important to you to be successful; to be productive; to be ambitious. 
Seek Pleasure in Life  
e.g., It is important to you to have a good time; to seek every chance you can to have fun; 
to do things that give you pleasure; to really enjoy life. 
Stimulation  
e.g., It is important to you to have excitement, challenge, and novelty; to do lots of 
different things in life; to look for adventures and take risks. 
Universalism  
e.g., It is important to you that every person in the world is treated equally 
Conformity  





Adapted from the values listed in “Bringing values back in: The adequacy of the 
European social survey to measure values in 20 countries” (Davidov, Schmidt, & 








AMT Word Lists 
List	  A	   List	  B	   List	  C	  
Guilty	   Grief	   Sad	  
Happy	   Devoted	   Joy	  
Relieved	   Hopeful	   Smile	  
Hopeless	   Rejected	   Misery	  
Failure	   Helpless	   Ashamed	  
Proud	   Amazed	   Faithful	  
Grave	   Blame	   Weakness	  
Eager	   Pleased	   Lively	  
Glorious	   Calm	   Cheer	  
Ugly	   Awful	   Solemn	  
Worse	   Mistake	   Tired	  





Conditional Treatment Effects for Depression Outcomes 
Conditional Effects of the Mixed-Control Contrast on Time 2 CES-D Score of the 
Moderation by Time 1 CES-D Score 
Time 1 
CES-D Effect SE t p 
2.00 7.66 2.22 3.45 .00 
4.30 6.72 1.99 3.38 .00 
6.60 5.79 1.78 3.26 .00 
8.90 4.86 1.58 3.08 .00 
11.20 3.93 1.40 2.81 .01 
13.50 2.99 1.25 2.39 .02 
15.18 2.31 1.17 1.98 .05 
15.80 2.06 1.15 1.80 .07 
18.10 1.13 1.10 1.03 .31 
20.40 0.20 1.11 0.18 .86 
22.70 -0.74 1.19 -0.62 .54 
25.00 -1.67 1.31 -1.27 .20 
27.30 -2.60 1.47 -1.77 .08 
28.53 -3.10 1.57 -1.98 .05 
29.60 -3.53 1.66 -2.13 .03 
31.90 -4.47 1.87 -2.39 .02 
34.20 -5.40 2.09 -2.59 .01 
36.50 -6.33 2.31 -2.74 .01 
38.80 -7.26 2.55 -2.85 .01 
41.10 -8.20 2.79 -2.94 .00 
43.40 -9.13 3.04 -3.01 .00 
45.70 -10.06 3.28 -3.06 .00 
48.00 -10.99 3.53 -3.11 .00 
 
 
Conditional Effects of the Concrete-Control Contrast on Time 2 CES-D Score of the 
Moderation by Time 1 CES-D Score 
Time 1 
CES-D Effect SE t p 




3.30 5.20 1.96 2.65 .01 
5.60 4.64 1.76 2.64 .01 
7.90 4.07 1.56 2.60 .01 
10.20 3.50 1.39 2.52 .01 
12.50 2.94 1.25 2.36 .02 
14.80 2.37 1.14 2.08 .04 
15.45 2.21 1.12 1.97 .05 
17.10 1.81 1.09 1.66 .10 
19.40 1.24 1.09 1.14 .26 
21.70 0.67 1.15 0.59 .56 
24.00 0.11 1.26 0.09 .93 
26.30 -0.46 1.41 -0.32 .75 
28.60 -1.02 1.59 -0.65 .52 
30.90 -1.59 1.78 -0.89 .37 
33.20 -2.16 1.99 -1.08 .28 
35.50 -2.72 2.21 -1.23 .22 
37.80 -3.29 2.43 -1.35 .18 
40.10 -3.85 2.66 -1.45 .15 
42.40 -4.42 2.90 -1.53 .13 
44.70 -4.98 3.13 -1.59 .11 
47.00 -5.55 3.37 -1.64 .10 
 
 
Conditional Effects of the Mixed-Control Contrast on Time 3 CES-D Score of the 
Moderation by Time 1 CES-D Score 
Time 1 
CES-D Effect SE t p 
2.00 4.71 2.34 2.01 .05 
2.64 4.49 2.27 1.98 .05 
4.30 3.92 2.10 1.87 .06 
6.60 3.13 1.87 1.67 .10 
8.90 2.34 1.66 1.41 .16 
11.20 1.56 1.48 1.05 .29 
13.50 0.77 1.32 0.58 .56 
15.80 -0.02 1.21 -0.02 .99 
18.10 -0.81 1.16 -0.69 .49 
20.40 -1.60 1.18 -1.35 .18 




23.11 -2.52 1.28 -1.98 .05 
25.00 -3.17 1.39 -2.28 .02 
27.30 -3.96 1.56 -2.54 .01 
29.60 -4.75 1.76 -2.70 .01 
31.90 -5.53 1.98 -2.79 .01 
34.20 -6.32 2.21 -2.86 .00 
36.50 -7.11 2.46 -2.90 .00 
38.80 -7.90 2.71 -2.92 .00 
41.10 -8.69 2.96 -2.93 .00 
43.40 -9.47 3.22 -2.94 .00 
45.70 -10.26 3.48 -2.95 .00 
 
 
Conditional Effects of the Concrete-Control Contrast on Time 3 CES-D Score Moderated 
by Time 1 CES-D Score 
Time 1 
CES-D Effect SE t p 
1.00 6.28 2.44 2.57 .01 
3.30 5.58 2.20 2.54 .01 
5.60 4.88 1.97 2.48 .01 
7.90 4.18 1.76 2.38 .02 
10.20 3.49 1.56 2.23 .03 
12.50 2.79 1.40 1.99 .05 
12.59 2.76 1.40 1.97 .05 
14.80 2.09 1.29 1.62 .11 
17.10 1.39 1.22 1.13 .26 
19.40 0.69 1.23 0.56 .58 
21.70 -0.01 1.29 -0.01 .99 
24.00 -0.71 1.41 -0.50 .61 
26.30 -1.41 1.58 -0.90 .37 
28.60 -2.11 1.77 -1.19 .23 
30.90 -2.81 1.98 -1.42 .16 
33.20 -3.51 2.22 -1.59 .11 
35.50 -4.21 2.46 -1.71 .09 
37.80 -4.91 2.71 -1.81 .07 
40.10 -5.61 2.96 -1.89 .06 
42.40 -6.31 3.22 -1.96 .05 
43.07 -6.51 3.30 -1.97 .05 











Conditional Treatment Effects for Rumination Outcomes 
Conditional Effects of the Mixed-Control Contrast on Time 2 RRS Score Moderated by 
Time 1 CES-D Score 
Time 1 
CES-D Effect SE t p 
2.00 3.47 2.51 1.38 .17 
4.30 2.74 2.25 1.21 .23 
6.60 2.00 2.01 1.00 .32 
8.90 1.27 1.78 0.71 .48 
11.20 0.53 1.58 0.34 .74 
13.50 -0.20 1.42 -0.14 .89 
15.80 -0.93 1.30 -0.72 .47 
18.10 -1.67 1.24 -1.34 .18 
20.40 -2.40 1.26 -1.91 .06 
20.71 -2.50 1.27 -1.98 .05 
22.70 -3.13 1.34 -2.34 .02 
25.00 -3.87 1.48 -2.61 .01 
27.30 -4.60 1.67 -2.76 .01 
29.60 -5.34 1.88 -2.84 .01 
31.90 -6.07 2.11 -2.87 .00 
34.20 -6.80 2.36 -2.88 .00 
36.50 -7.54 2.62 -2.87 .00 
38.80 -8.27 2.89 -2.86 .00 
41.10 -9.01 3.16 -2.85 .01 
43.40 -9.74 3.44 -2.83 .01 
45.70 -10.47 3.72 -2.81 .01 
48.00 -11.21 4.00 -2.80 .01 
 
Conditional Effects of the Concrete-Control Contrast on Time 2 RRS Score Moderated by 
Time 1 CES-D Score 
Time 1 
CES-D Effect SE t p 
1.00 4.89 2.53 1.93 .06 




5.60 3.36 2.04 1.65 .10 
7.90 2.60 1.81 1.43 .15 
10.20 1.84 1.61 1.14 .26 
12.50 1.07 1.44 0.74 .46 
14.80 0.31 1.32 0.23 .81 
17.10 -0.45 1.26 -0.36 .72 
19.40 -1.22 1.26 -0.96 .34 
21.70 -1.98 1.34 -1.48 .14 
24.00 -2.74 1.47 -1.87 .06 
24.79 -3.00 1.52 -1.97 .05 
26.30 -3.50 1.64 -2.14 .03 
28.60 -4.27 1.85 -2.31 .02 
30.90 -5.03 2.07 -2.42 .02 
33.20 -5.79 2.32 -2.50 .01 
35.50 -6.56 2.57 -2.55 .01 
37.80 -7.32 2.84 -2.58 .01 
40.10 -8.08 3.11 -2.60 .01 
42.40 -8.84 3.38 -2.62 .01 
44.70 -9.61 3.66 -2.63 .01 
47.00 -10.37 3.94 -2.63 .01 
 
Conditional Effects of the Mixed-Control Contrast on Time 3 RRS Score Moderated by 
Time 1 CES-D Score 
Time 1 
CES-D Effect SE t p 
2.00 2.72 2.57 1.06 .29 
4.30 1.97 2.31 0.85 .40 
6.60 1.21 2.06 0.59 .56 
8.90 0.46 1.83 0.25 .80 
11.20 -0.29 1.62 -0.18 .86 
13.50 -1.05 1.45 -0.72 .47 
15.80 -1.80 1.33 -1.35 .18 
18.01 -2.52 1.28 -1.98 .05 
18.10 -2.55 1.28 -2.00 .05 
20.40 -3.31 1.29 -2.56 .01 
22.70 -4.06 1.38 -2.94 .00 
25.00 -4.81 1.52 -3.16 .00 
27.30 -5.57 1.71 -3.25 .00 




31.90 -7.07 2.17 -3.26 .00 
34.20 -7.82 2.43 -3.22 .00 
36.50 -8.58 2.69 -3.18 .00 
38.80 -9.33 2.97 -3.14 .00 
41.10 -10.08 3.25 -3.10 .00 
43.40 -10.84 3.53 -3.07 .00 
45.70 -11.59 3.82 -3.03 .00 
48.00 -12.34 4.11 -3.00 .00 
 
Conditional Effects of the Concrete-Control Contrast on Time 3 RRS Score Moderated by 
Time 1 CES-D Score 
Time 1 
CES-D Effect SE t p 
1.00 3.94 2.56 1.54 .13 
3.30 3.29 2.31 1.43 .16 
5.60 2.65 2.07 1.28 .20 
7.90 2.00 1.84 1.08 .28 
10.20 1.35 1.64 0.82 .41 
12.50 0.70 1.47 0.48 .63 
14.80 0.06 1.35 0.04 .97 
17.10 -0.59 1.28 -0.46 .64 
19.40 -1.24 1.28 -0.97 .34 
21.70 -1.89 1.35 -1.40 .16 
24.00 -2.54 1.48 -1.71 .09 
26.30 -3.18 1.65 -1.93 .06 
26.97 -3.37 1.71 -1.97 .05 
28.60 -3.83 1.86 -2.06 .04 
30.90 -4.48 2.08 -2.15 .03 
33.20 -5.13 2.33 -2.20 .03 
35.50 -5.77 2.58 -2.24 .03 
37.80 -6.42 2.84 -2.26 .03 
40.10 -7.07 3.11 -2.27 .02 
42.40 -7.72 3.39 -2.28 .02 
44.70 -8.37 3.66 -2.28 .02 






The Moderation Mediation Analysis for Treatment Differences in the Mixed-Control 
Contrast on the RRS Mediated by MMS, VLQ and KIMS 
Conditional Direct Effects of Mixed-Control Contrast on Time 2 RRS through Time 2 
KIMS. 
Percentile T1 CES-D Effect SE t p 
10 8.00 1.61 1.84 0.88 .38 
25 11.00 0.68 1.57 0.43 .67 
50 17.00 -1.20 1.24 -0.97 .33 
75 24.00 -3.39 1.39 -2.44 .02 
90 32.00 -5.89 2.09 -2.82 .01 
 
Conditional Indirect Effects of Mixed-Control Contrast on Time 2 RRS through Time 2 
KIMS. 
Percentile T1 CES-D Effect 
Boot 
SE BootLLCI BootULCI 
10 8.00 -0.06 0.43 -1.05 0.70 
25 11.00 -0.08 0.37 -0.98 0.56 
50 17.00 -0.12 0.30 -0.84 0.41 
75 24.00 -0.16 0.34 -1.04 0.41 
90 32.00 -0.21 0.51 -1.53 0.59 
 
Conditional Direct Effects of Mixed-Control Contrast on Time 2 RRS through Time 2 
MMS. 
Percentile T1 CES-D Effect SE t p 
10 8.00 1.48 1.88 0.79 .43 
25 11.00 0.53 1.61 0.33 .74 
50 17.00 -1.36 1.27 -1.07 .28 
75 24.00 -3.58 1.42 -2.52 .01 






Conditional Indirect Effects of Mixed-Control Contrast on Time 2 RRS through Time 2 
MMS. 
Percentile T1 CES-D Effect 
Boot 
SE BootLLCI BootULCI 
10 8.00 0.07 0.26 -0.20 1.09 
25 11.00 0.06 0.23 -0.18 0.91 
50 17.00 0.05 0.17 -0.15 0.65 
75 24.00 0.03 0.15 -0.15 0.56 
90 32.00 0.01 0.19 -0.30 0.50 
 
Conditional Direct Effects of Mixed-Control Contrast on Time 2 RRS through Time 2 
VLQ 
Percentile T1 CES-D Effect SE t p 
10 8.00 1.24 1.89 0.66 .51 
25 11.00 0.29 1.62 0.18 .86 
50 17.00 -1.60 1.28 -1.25 .21 
75 24.00 -3.82 1.43 -2.66 .01 
90 32.00 -6.34 2.13 -2.98 < .001 
 
Conditional Indirect Effects of Mixed-Control Contrast on Time 2 RRS through Time 2 
VLQ 
Percentile T1 CES-D Effect 
Boot 
SE BootLLCI BootULCI 
10 8.00 0.32 0.36 -0.10 1.59 
25 11.00 0.31 0.33 -0.11 1.41 
50 17.00 0.29 0.30 -0.12 1.19 
75 24.00 0.27 0.30 -0.11 1.16 
90 32.00 0.24 0.35 -0.10 1.52 
 
Conditional Direct Effects of Mixed-Control Contrast on Time 3 RRS through Time 3 
KIMS 
Percentile T1 CES-D Effect SE t p 
10 8.00 1.13 1.85 0.61 .54 




50 17.00 -1.97 1.25 -1.58 .12 
75 24.00 -4.38 1.40 -3.13 < .001 
90 32.00 -7.14 2.10 -3.40 < .001 
 
Conditional Indirect Effects of Mixed-Control Contrast on Time 3 RRS through Time 3 
KIMS 
Percentile T1 CES-D Effect 
Boot 
SE BootLLCI BootULCI 
10 8.00 -0.11 0.52 -1.35 0.76 
25 11.00 -0.09 0.45 -1.24 0.64 
50 17.00 -0.06 0.36 -0.95 0.58 
75 24.00 -0.03 0.37 -0.79 0.77 
90 32.00 0.01 0.53 -0.92 1.28 
 
Conditional Direct Effects of Mixed-Control Contrast on Time 3 RRS through Time 3 
MMS 
Percentile T1 CES-D Effect SE t p 
10 8.00 0.96 1.92 0.50 .62 
25 11.00 -­‐0.03 1.64 -­‐0.02 .98 
50 17.00 -­‐2.02 1.29 -­‐1.56 .12 
75 24.00 -­‐4.33 1.46 -­‐2.98 < .001 
90 32.00 -­‐6.97 2.19 -­‐3.19 < .001 
 
Conditional Indirect Effects of Mixed-Control Contrast on Time 3 RRS through Time 3 
MMS 
Percentile T1 CES-D Effect 
Boot 
SE BootLLCI BootULCI 
10 8.00 0.07 0.22 -0.14 0.87 
25 11.00 0.04 0.18 -0.15 0.66 
50 17.00 -0.02 0.13 -0.51 0.14 
75 24.00 -0.08 0.18 -0.81 0.09 
90 32.00 -0.16 0.30 -1.41 0.15 
 





Percentile T1 CES-D Effect SE t p 
10 8.00 1.02 1.95 0.53 .60 
25 11.00 0.00 1.67 0.00 1.00 
50 17.00 -2.04 1.32 -1.54 .13 
75 24.00 -4.42 1.47 -3.00 < .001 
90 32.00 -7.13 2.19 -3.26 < .001 
 
 
Conditional Indirect Effects of Mixed-Control Contrast on Time 3 RRS through Time 3 
VLQ 
Percentile T1 CES-D Effect 
Boot 
SE BootLLCI BootULCI 
10 8.00 0.00 0.37 -0.72 0.84 
25 11.00 0.00 0.34 -0.66 0.77 
50 17.00 0.00 0.29 -0.53 0.64 
75 24.00 0.00 0.25 -0.49 0.57 
90 32.00 0.00 0.26 -0.51 0.57 
 
Note. For the tables above, T1 CES-D = Score on the Time 1 administration of the Center for 
Epidemiological Studies- Depression Scale, Boot	  SE	  =	  the	  standard	  error	  that	  resulted	  from	  the	  bootstrap	  
analysis,	  BootLLCI	  =	  the	  bootstrapped	  lower	  limit	  of	  the	  95%	  confidence	  interval	  for	  the	  indirect	  effect	  at	  
the	  conditional	  point	  listed,	  BootULCI	  =	  the	  bootstrapped	  upper	  limit	  of	  the	  95%	  confidence	  interval	  for	  
the	  indirect	  effect	  at	  the	  conditional	  point	  listed.	  





The Moderation Mediation Analysis for Treatment Differences in the Mixed-Control 
Contrast on CES-D Time 2 mediated by Time 2 RRS 
 







Note. R2 was .62 for the overall regression, p < .001. CES-D = Center for Epidemiological Studies- 
Depression Scale, RRS = Ruminative Response Scale, Interaction = Mixed-Control Contrast x Time 1 
CES-D.  
 








Note. R2 was .74 for the overall regression, p < .001. CES-D = Center for Epidemiological Studies- 





 B SE t Sig. 
Constant 21.59 3.99 5.42 < .001 
Mixed-Control 
Contrast -1.86 1.24 -1.50 .14 
Time 1 CES-D 0.51 0.10 4.94 < .001 
Interaction -0.32 0.13 -2.45 .02 
Time 1 RRS 0.49 0.09 5.63 < .001 
 B SE t Sig. 
Constant 3.83 2.89 1.33 .19 
Time 2 RRS 0.59 0.05 11.02 < .001 
Mixed-Control 
Contrast 1.99 0.83 2.39 .02 
Time 1 CES-D 0.43 0.07 5.84 < .001 
Interaction -0.22 0.09 -2.44 .02 





The Moderation Mediation Analysis for Treatment Differences in the Concrete-Control 
Contrast on CES-D Time 2 mediated by Time 2 RRS 
 







Note. R2 was .61 for the overall regression, p < .001. CES-D = Center for Epidemiological Studies- 
Depression Scale, RRS = Ruminative Response Scale, Interaction = Concrete-Control Contrast x Time 1 
CES-D.  
 








Note. R2 was .77 for the overall regression, p < .001. CES-D = Center for Epidemiological Studies- 
Depression Scale, RRS = Ruminative Response Scale, Interaction = Concrete-Control Contrast x Time 1 
CES-D.  
  
 B SE t Sig. 
Constant 17.70 3.77 4.69 < .001 
Concrete -Control 
Contrast -0.79 1.25 -0.63 .53 
Time 1 CES-D 0.41 0.10 4.22 < .001 
Interaction -0.33 0.13 -2.57 .01 
Time 1 RRS 0.58 0.08 6.94 < .001 
 B SE t Sig. 
Constant 7.79 2.57 3.03 < .001 
Time 2 RRS 0.59 0.05 11.69 < .001 
Concrete-Control 
Contrast 2.01 0.80 2.51 .01 
Time 1 CES-D 0.60 0.07 9.11 < .001 
Interaction -0.06 0.08 -0.66 .51 





The Moderation Mediation Analysis for Treatment Differences in the Mixed-Control 
Contrast on CES-D Time 3 mediated by Time 3 RRS 
 







Note. R2 was .57 for the overall regression, p < .001. CES-D = Center for Epidemiological Studies- 
Depression Scale, RRS = Ruminative Response Scale, Interaction = Mixed-Control Contrast x Time 1 
CES-D.  
 








Note. R2 was .74 for the overall regression, p < .001. CES-D = Center for Epidemiological Studies- 






 B SE t Sig. 
Constant 21.58 3.77 5.73 < .001 
Mixed-Control 
Contrast -0.91 1.27 -0.72 .48 
Time 1 CES-D 0.48 0.10 4.87 < .001 
Interaction -0.28 0.13 -2.17 .03 
Time 1 RRS 0.46 0.08 5.50 < .001 
 B SE t Sig. 
Constant -0.39 2.84 -0.14 .89 
Time 3 RRS 0.66 0.05 12.56 < .001 
Mixed-Control 
Contrast 1.64 0.88 1.87 .06 
Time 1 CES-D 0.35 0.07 4.90 < .001 
Interaction -0.11 0.09 -1.18 .24 





The Moderation Mediation Analysis for Treatment Differences in the Concrete-Control 
Contrast on CES-D Time 3 mediated by Time 3 RRS 
 







Note. R2 was .56 for the overall regression, p < .001. CES-D = Center for Epidemiological Studies- 
Depression Scale, RRS = Ruminative Response Scale, Interaction = Concrete-Control Contrast x Time 1 
CES-D.  
 








Note. R2 was .72 for the overall regression, p < .001. CES-D = Center for Epidemiological Studies- 




 B SE t Sig. 
Constant 23.00 4.05 5.67 < .001 
Concrete -Control 
Contrast -2.72 1.27 -2.14 .03 
Time 1 CES-D 0.51 0.11 4.82 < .001 
Interaction -0.33 0.13 -2.45 .02 
Time 1 RRS 0.42 0.09 4.68 < .001 
 B SE t Sig. 
Constant -3.51 2.90 -1.21 .23 
Time 3 RRS 0.63 0.05 12.11 < .001 
Concrete -Control 
Contrast 0.70 0.84 0.83 .41 
Time 1 CES-D 0.29 0.07 3.98 < .001 
Interaction -0.13 0.09 -1.43 .16 
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